Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1999

Executive Compensation and the Investment Opportunity Sets of
Initial Public Offerings.
Tanya S. Nowlin
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Nowlin, Tanya S., "Executive Compensation and the Investment Opportunity Sets of Initial Public
Offerings." (1999). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 7053.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/7053

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the
text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor qualify illustrations and
photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment
can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and
there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright
material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning
the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to
right in equal sections with small overlaps.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher qualify 6” x 9* black and white photographic
prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for
an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA

UMI"
800-521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY
SETS OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty o f the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment o f the
requirements for the degree o f
Doctor o f Philosophy
in
The Department o f Accounting

by
Tanya S. Nowlin
B.B A ., Sam Houston State University, 1982
M.P.Acc., Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, 1992
December 1999

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number 9951613

___

®

UMI

UMI Microform9951613
Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying undei Title 17, United States Code.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................................iii
ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................... iv
1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 1
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT.....................................................9
2.1 Sample Structure.......................................................................................................... 9
2.1.1 IPO Type Descriptions and Predictions......................................................... 11
22. Growth, Use o f Proceeds, and R isk_____________________________________15
2.2.1 Risk and Proceeds.............................................................................................17
2.3 Compensation............................................................................................................. 18
2.3.1 Compensation and Investment Opportunities............................................... 20
2.3.2 Compensation and CEO Characteristics........................................................27
2.3.3 Compensation and IPO Classifications..........................................................31
3. SAMPLE SELECTION, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AND VARIABLE
DEFINITIONS..................................................................................................................... 38
3.1 Variable Definitions...................................................................................................41
3.1.1 Compensation Variables..................................................................................44
3.1.2 IOS Variables....................................................................................................45
3.1.3 CEO Characteristic Variables.........................................................................47
4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS................................................... 48
4.1 Sample Structure........................................................................................................ 48
4.2 Growth, Use o f Proceeds, and R isk......................................................................... 53
4.2.1 Risk and Proceeds..................
60
4.3 Compensation.............................................................................................................63
4.4 Sensitivity Analyses................................................................................................... 87
4.4.1 Growth Proxies and Industry Effects............................................................. 87
4.4.2 Compensation, Industry Effects, and Performance Evaluation...................88
5. SUMMARY, BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF SAMPLE, AND FUTURE
RESEARCH..........................................................................................................................91
5.1 Benefits and Limitations o f Sample......................................................................... 92
5.2 Future Research......................................................................................................... 93
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................... 95
APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS..................................................................... 100
V IT A .........................................................

101

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Compensation Predictions................................................................................ 36
Table 2: Sample Selection Procedures........................................................................... 39
Table 3: Sample distribution by one-digit SIC code.....................................................39
Table 4: Sample distribution by IPO type...................................................................... 39
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on Selected Variables.................................................... 42
Table 6: Differences in Means for Start-ups and Mature Firms................................... 50
Table 7: Differences in Means for the Three IPO Types........................

51

Table 8: Frequencies o f Uses o f Proceeds by IPO T ype.............................................. 55
Table 9: Relation o f Growth Proxy to Uses o f Proceeds, Risk, and IPO Type
Dummies............................................................................................................ 56
Table 10: Relation o f Growth Proxy to Uses o f Proceeds, Risk, and IPO Type
Dummies: Comparison of Two Risk Proxies................................................ 58
Table 11: Relation o f Risk to Growth and Proceeds...................................................... 61
Table 12: Distribution o f Cash Bonus Plan Disclosures................................................ 65
Table 13: Regression Results for CEO Salary................................................................ 69
Table 14: Regression Results for CEO Salary per Employment Agreement............... 71
Table 15: Regression Results for CEO Cash Bonus Compensation............................. 76
Table 16: Regression Results for CEO Cash Compensation.........................................78
Table 17: Regression Results for CEO Bonus as a Proportion o f Total Cash
Compensation....................................................................................................80
Table 18: Regression Results for CEO Stock Option V alues........................................82
Table 19: Summary o f Compensation Results................................................................ 86

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT
This study examines how the components o f CEO compensation contracts vary
with characteristics o f initial public offering firms (IPOs). There are two major steps
in the analysis.

The first step investigates whether IPOs exhibit variation in

characteristics that theory predicts affect compensation contracts. The second step
investigates whether these differences across firms are related to the use o f accounting
versus non-accounting performance evaluation measures, levels o f base salary and
cash bonuses, and the value o f stock options for CEOs.

Results from this study

support the importance o f modeling compensation components separately. Theoretical
constructs differ depending on the type o f compensation being explained.

This

separation allows more powerful inferences than are possible in studies that combine
the components.
The use o f accounting earnings in incentive compensation contracts has been
well documented for large firms. Accounting numbers are useful when they signal the
value added by the manager. For IPOs that are creating or exercising growth options
by investment in research and development or advertising, accounting numbers may be
less informative, which leads to a substitution o f stock-based incentives for incomebased incentives.

This is the first study to examine the relative importance o f

accounting-based compensation for firms that are going public. For the analyses, IPOs
are classified by the observable characteristics o f their investment opportunity sets
(IOS). This includes an examination o f the relations among growth, ex ante risk, and
ex post risk. Cross-sectional variation in IOS measures such as size, growth, risk, and

iv
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firm performance are supported by the data and this variation partly explains crosssectional differences in compensation contracts. Results from tests that include CEO
characteristics and equity ownership are clearly inconsistent with CEO opportunism.
Also, the results are generally consistent with efficient contracting.

v
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study examines how the components o f chief executive officer (CEO)
compensation contracts vary with characteristics o f initial public offering firms (IPOs).
There are two major steps in the analysis. The first step investigates whether IPOs
exhibit variation in characteristics that theory predicts affect compensation contracts.
The second step investigates whether these differences across firms are related to the
use o f accounting versus non-accounting performance evaluation measures, levels o f
base salary and cash bonuses, and the value o f stock options for CEOs.
Most compensation research focuses on samples o f large, seasoned firms
because o f the difficulty in obtaining compensation data for smaller firms. Large firms
generally have long operating histories. Further, although dispersed among different
industries, such samples are heavily weighted towards firms with relatively large
proportions o f assets in place. Such firms use accounting numbers for performance
evaluation because they reflect the effort and ability o f the manager [Sloan (1993)].
In contrast to large firms, the structure o f compensation contracts in small firms,
especially IPOs, is largely unexplored.
seasoned public firms.

Yet IPOs provide important contrasts to

First, the process o f taking a firm public entails major

corporate control changes. These changes encourage the review o f current contracts,
and, perhaps, the addition o f new contracts to better align managerial incentives with
the changed focus and environment o f the firm. Thus, compensation contracts in IPOs
are “current”, i.e., new or recently changed.

An examination o f 111 offering

prospectuses, executive employment agreements, and stock option plans, confirms that

1
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managerial incentives for IPOs are current. In contrast, since recontracting is costly, it
is less likely that contracts are revised each year for seasoned firms.

Therefore,

contracts o f seasoned firms may be less informative if the compensation incentives for
these firms are not current.1
Second, monitoring issues are different for IPOs because managers and directors
o f IPOs have larger ownership percentages than managers and directors o f large firms.
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) report that median equity ownership percentages
for CEOs o f large firms is 0.10% compared to 10.2% for this study. Cyert, Kang, and
Shah (1997) find ownership by officers and directors (excluding the CEO) to be 4.88%
for a sample o f large and small firms versus 26.2% for this study.

Thus, equity

ownership may play a more important role in IPOs than it does in large, seasoned
firms with low CEO ownership.2

This is because equity ownership provides a

substitute incentive mechanism that is particularly useful when accounting numbers
are poor measures o f managerial performance.
Accounting earnings have a dual role. They provide information that is useful in
valuing the firm (decision-making) and that is useful to owners and debtholders for use
in monitoring and evaluating the performance o f management (stewardship) [Gjesdal
(1981)]. Paul (1992) shows that performance evaluation should be based on firmspecific events that are under the manager’s control and that reflect the value added by

1 Large firm samples after 1993 may have revised contracts if the firms were affected by the $ 1 million
cap on tax deductibility o f compensation imposed by the Revenue Reconciliation Act o f 1993.
2 One must be careful comparing ownership percentages across firms since small percentages o f large
firms could exceed large percentages o f small firms as a percentage o f managers' wealth.

2
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the manager. Accounting numbers may not be useful for performance evaluation for
many IPOs because o f losses associated with early stages o f operation and investment
in growth opportunities.

IPOs tend to have relatively high fixed operating costs,

including research and development (R&D) and advertising.

Since these types o f

expenditures are expensed immediately, tying managerial performance evaluation to
accounting earnings for IPOs may be counterproductive.

Such a tie encourages

managers to cut R&D, advertising, or other discretionary expenditures to increase
accounting earnings rather than to increase firm value.

Therefore, stock-based

incentive compensation may play a more important role in IPOs than it does in large,
seasoned firms.
Results from this study confirm that, except for the largest firms, accounting
numbers are used less frequently in evaluating managers. Using a sample o f 111 firms
that went public between May 1996 and February 1998, this study finds that all o f the
firms either have a stock option plan in place prior to the offering or have designed a
plan to be implemented on the date o f the offering. Ninety percent o f the firms have
cash bonus plans, but very few o f the employment agreements, even if new or revised,
disclose the actual performance criteria used in determining awards. This suggests
that the boards o f directors retain discretion in making bonus awards and thus,
executive compensation is not mechanically tied to accounting earnings for these
firms.
Theory predicts that compensation

contracts

vary

systematically

with

characteristics o f firms that are collectively referred to as the firm's investment

3
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opportunity set (IOS).

A firm’s IOS is defined as its prospective investment

opportunities and associated payoff distributions [Smith and Watts (1992)].
Variations in a firm's IOS are driven by firm-specific investment in “specialized
physical and human capital” [Smith and Watts (1992)].

A firm's IOS is

multidimensional, and includes the type o f knowledge the firm produces, production
and information externalities among a firm's investments, technological and demand
uncertainty, regulation, type o f customers and employees, asset specificity, product
and other tortious liabilities, and tax structure (domestic and foreign) [Christie, Joye
and Watts (1998); Christie (1998)]. Christie, Joye and Watts (1998) argue that several
o f these IOS characteristics are related to size, growth, and risk.
Prior research examines the relation between executive compensation and
several aspects o f firms' IOS, such as size, growth, and risk. Gaver and Gaver (1993),
Clinch (1991), Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993), and Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang
(1996) classify firms as low or high growth. This high or low growth classification is
used to analyze differences in executive compensation between these two categories.
Essentially all prior compensation studies use size as a control variable.
This study also uses size, growth and risk as relevant IOS characteristics.
However, in contrast to prior research, this study examines these differing IOS
characteristics in a sample o f IPOs. Lang (1991) reports that IPOs are, on average,
high growth and high risk, but they are not homogeneous.

He finds considerable

differences in firm characteristics such as size, age, proceeds, revenue, book value of
equity, and risk. Results from this study confirm that IPOs are not homogeneous, but

4
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have cross-sectional variation in numerous firm characteristics.

Some o f these

characteristics are size, growth opportunities, length o f operating history, risk, and
firm performance.
An additional contribution o f this study is the identification o f risk measures that
represent both an ex ante and ex po st focus. IPO prospectuses disclose risk factors that
may affect each firm. These risk factors are an ex ante measure. Conversely, an ex
post measure o f risk is the volatility o f stock returns. This identification allows an
analysis of ex ante risk and its relation to ex p ost risk, i.e., stock return volatility. The
results indicate that the number o f risk factors is a significant predictor o f volatility
and that the relation has diminished through time.

This finding has important

implications for SEC policy-makers and the investment community.
The primary growth measure used by researchers is the market to book ratio.3
This proxy measures growth with error. This ratio is likely to be different for an IPO
sample as compared to a sample o f seasoned firms for two reasons.

First, using

depreciation-adjusted historical cost for property, plant and equipment, can cause the
book value o f firms with long lived assets to differ significantly from the replacement
cost o f existing production capacity. If the average age o f depreciable assets is lower
for IPOs, then a sample o f IPOs, which generally includes younger firms, may reduce
this measurement error. Second, IPOs also have a larger proportion o f expenditures in
R&D, which is expensed for accounting purposes. If some o f these expenditures have

3 This ratio is the market value o f equity plus the book value o f debt divided by the book value o f total
assets.

5
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a future benefit, then the denominator o f the market to book ratio is downward biased
and the ratio itself is upward biased. Thus, this study provides insight into using the
market to book ratio as a proxy for growth for firms which (1) have younger assets in
place, and (2) have relatively high R&D.
To provide additional insights into the effect o f the IOS on compensation
contracts, two other approaches to capturing salient features o f the IOS are also used.
First, examination o f the uses o f the proceeds disclosed in the offering prospectuses
permits assessment o f whether IPOs are creating or exercising growth options. The
categorization o f the uses o f IPO proceeds provides an additional proxy for growth that
is not usually available for large, seasoned firms. The categorization o f the uses o f
IPO proceeds is related to the size o f the offering, the types o f assets being managed,
the age o f the firm and firm risk.
Second, IPOs are classified based on their years o f prior operating history. This
classification segregates IPOs into mature firms (five or more years o f operating
history) and start-up firms (less than five years o f operating history). In both cases,
firms are categorized based on observable data. These classifications provide insights
about the IOS and differences among IPOs that are related to compensation contract
differences.
For the sample, classification based on years o f prior operating history results in
75 mature firms and 36 start-ups. Within the group o f 75 mature firms, there is a
subgroup with unique characteristics. This subgroup is known as roll-ups, which are
previously unrelated firms that merge contemporaneously with the offering.

6
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By

definition, roll-ups are multidivisional firms, and have more complex monitoring and
incentive problems than firms that are a single operating unit. Eighteen o f the 75
mature firms are classified as roll-ups. This classification scheme is empirically useful
in understanding incentive compensation, i.e., bonuses and stock option values.
In summary, this study contributes to the literature in several ways.

First,

hypotheses on variations in firm characteristics by IPO type are tested. Unlike prior
IPO studies, this study does not assume that IPOs are homogeneous. Results from the
study confirm this. Second, using firm-specific data on cash salary, cash bonus, and
the value o f stock options, this study examines hypotheses regarding the expected
relation between IOS and the components o f CEO compensation.

Testing the

components separately is important because theory underlying fixed and incentive
compensation is different.

Additionally, the study analyzes predictions about the

effect o f certain CEO characteristics and equity ownership on compensation. Results
are clearly inconsistent with CEO opportunism.
Overall, the results indicate that CEO base salaries are increasing in the size o f
the firm, CEO equity ownership, and CEO tenure, but decreasing when the CEO is
also a founder.

Salaries for roll-ups and start-ups don’t seem to be significantly

different from those o f other mature firms. Cash incentive compensation (bonuses) is
increasing in size and officers’ and directors’ equity ownership but decreasing for roll
ups and start-ups. In addition, ROA for the largest one-third o f the sample firms is
positively associated with cash bonuses.

This supports the idea that accounting

information is useful for performance evaluation when it reflects the value added by

7
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the manager [Gjesdai (1981); Paul (1992)]. As expected, stock option values are
increasing in growth opportunities, especially for start-up firms.

The results are

generally consistent with efficient contracting.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the theory and development
o f hypotheses on the classification o f IPOs, growth, uses o f proceeds, and risk, and
variation in CEO compensation contracts. Section 3 describes the sample selection,
descriptive statistics, and variables collected for the study. The fourth section presents
the empirical methodology and findings for the study. The fifth section contains a
brief summary, discusses the benefits and limitations o f the sample, and offers
suggestions for future research.

8
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2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
This section reviews the relevant theoretical literature and develops testable
hypotheses related to CEO compensation for IPOs. The first subsection presents
background information on IPOs and discusses expected differences among IPO firm
characteristics. These differences lead to the development o f a two- and three-level
classification scheme that is explained in section 2.1.1.

The second subsection

discusses the relation between growth, risk, and the use o f the proceeds from the IPO.
The planned use of proceeds provides additional information on growth prospects that
is unique to IPOs. The third subsection discusses compensation theory and develops
hypotheses on the relations between compensation and investment opportunities, CEO
characteristics, and IPO classifications.
2.1 Sample Structure
The bulk of previous research into IPOs focuses on the role o f underwriters,
underpricing, and long-term performance. First, the literature characterizes IPOs as
young growth firms with a high degree o f uncertainty [Loughran (1993)]. IPOs are
also characterized by high information asymmetry between issuers (original owners)
and investors.

Little publicly available information exists for a private firm, so

investors must rely heavily on the information disclosed in the offering prospectus.
Beatty and Ritter (1986) call the uncertainty an investor has about the value o f EPO
stock, “ex ante uncertainty.” They use two proxies for ex ante uncertainty. The first
proxy is the number o f uses of proceeds disclosed in the prospectus. They use this
proxy because the SEC “requires more speculative issues to provide relatively detailed

9
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enumerations o f the uses o f proceeds.” The second proxy they employ is the inverse
o f the gross proceeds from the offering. Their reasoning is that this proxy “captures
the empirical regularity that smaller offerings are more speculative, on average, than
large offerings.” Although their focus is on underpricing, in regressions where the
dependent variable is the initial stock return, they interpret the positive coefficients on
these two proxies as an indication that investors positively correlate these measures
with ex ante uncertainty.
Second, studies that examine the long-run performance o f IPOs find that
operating performance declines as these firms season [Ibbotson (1975); Ritter (1991);
Loughran and Ritter (1995)]. One possible explanation for the underperformance o f
IPOs is that agency costs increase as the percentage o f managerial ownership
decreases.4

Explanatory variables used in these studies include firm-specific

characteristics such as size and age o f firm [Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997)].
However, few prior studies control for other IOS characteristics such as growth and
risk.
Finally, the process o f going public means that these firms exhibit substantial
dilution in managerial ownership. This dilution occurs both at the time o f the EPO and
as IPOs season. In a study o f IPOs from 1980-1983, Mikkelson et al. (1997) find that
the median ownership stake o f the CEO and other officers and directors decreases

4 On the other hand, firms like IBM have low managerial ownership percentages and are successful. As
stated earlier, small ownership percentages o f large firms can have large effects on CEO wealth.

10
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from 67.9% to 43.7% at the time o f the IPO. After five years, the median stake has
decreased to 28.6% and after ten years, this number declines to 17.9%.
This study contributes to the IPO literature by examining cross-sectional
differences among IPOs, and determining whether these differences explain variation
in compensation contracts.

The paper classifies IPOs in two ways:

operating history, and by the uses o f the offering proceeds.
examines an interesting subset o f IPOs:

by years o f

Further, this paper

roll-ups. A roll-up is unique because it

represents a group o f previously unrelated firms that merge at the time o f the offering.
These IPO classifications are discussed in the following section.
2.1.1 IPO Type Descriptions and Predictions
If all characteristics o f a firm's IOS were observable, these measures could be
used directly to examine differences among firms. Since this is not the case, and
proxies must be employed, this study develops a classification scheme to test if the
categories provide any additional evidence on differences among IPOs.
Most IPO studies use two age measures to differentiate IPOs. One measure is
the number of years o f operating history as disclosed in the prospectus, which
separates firms into those with over five years o f operations and those with less than
five years [Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997)]. The second measure is the number
o f years between incorporation and the IPO. However, the reliability o f this second

It
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measure is questionable, since examination o f prospectuses indicates than many o f
these firms reincorporate prior to the offering.5
This study uses years o f operating history to differentiate IPOs. Firms with less
than five years o f operating history are classified as start-ups; and, those with five or
more years o f operating history are classified as mature. Both groups can be single
firms or firms that have previously combined with other firms (either through
acquisitions and/or mergers). There is a subset o f mature firms called roll-ups. As
noted in the previous section, a roll-up is unique because it represents a group o f
previously unrelated firms that merge at the time o f the offering. Roll-ups are more
complex organizations than start-ups and other mature firms. The purpose o f this
classification scheme is to test whether the categories provide additional evidence on
differences among IPOs. If there are systematic differences among IPOs based on this
classification, then this approach may allow further isolation o f the firm's IOS. This
increases the power o f subsequent tests o f association between IOS and compensation
variables.
Start-up firms are generally found in high technology industries and invest
heavily in human capital and R&D. Prior studies on seasoned firms (non-IPO) have
developed measures o f growth based on the amount o f R&D expenditures, but a good
proxy for the investment in human capital has not been developed. Start-ups are likely

5 Many firms become Delaware corporations.

12
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to have a lower volume o f sales, higher initial operating costs, or a more aggressive
pricing strategy than mature IPOs [Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997)].
Based on the limited operating history o f start-ups, they should be smaller in size
than mature firms. Relevant size measures include sales, book value o f assets, market
value o f equity, and the size o f the offering.

This anticipated negative relation

between classification as a start-up and firm size also applies to computed variables
that are monotonic transformations o f these size-related variables.
Many start-up firms invest heavily in R&D. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) require that R&D expenditures be expensed in the period incurred
rather than capitalized. This accounting rule in combination with low sales volume
and high initial fixed operating costs implies that the earnings o f start-ups will be low
or possibly negative. Therefore, income-based performance measures for start-ups are
expected to be less useful than for mature firms.
The growth options o f start-ups are considerable. Growth drives the demand for
external financing which motivates an IPO. Not only are start-ups in positions to
exercise growth options, but to create them through new investments as well.
Therefore, it is predicted that growth proxies are greater for start-ups. This prediction
is partly due to the observation that start-ups have fewer assets-in-place; therefore, the
denominator of the growth proxy, book value o f assets, is smaller.
Although all IPOs are considered risky investments, start-ups have more ex ante
uncertainty due to their limited operating histories. Each IPO prospectus must disclose
a listing o f risk factors that may be applicable to each firm. Examples o f risk factors

13
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include:

reliance on major customers, competition in the company's markets,

fluctuations in quarterly operating results, control by principal stockholders,
dependence on key personnel, absence o f prior trading market, and possible volatility
o f stock price. Using the number o f risk factors listed in the IPO prospectus as a proxy
for ex ante risk, start-ups are expected to have a greater number o f these factors. An ex
post risk measure is the volatility o f stock returns. Start-ups are expected to be more
volatile than mature firms.
Mature firms represent IPOs with relatively longer operating histories, more
assets-in-place, and larger size. Frequently, the original private owner o f a mature
firm becomes the CEO/Chairman o f the Board at the time of, or prior to, going public
and retains considerable ownership in the company. On the other hand, some mature
firm owners may use the IPO as an opportunity to cash cut o f their prior investment,
resulting in lower retained ownership and limited future management roles.
A subset o f the mature firms is known as roll-ups. This group o f firms, which
are previously unrelated and merge contemporaneously with the public offering,
present a unique setting for analyzing agency problems and corporate governance
issues.

These firms are usually in the same or closely related industries and

presumably consolidate operations for synergistic reasons. The size o f roll-up firms
varies and is dependent on whether the "founding companies" are o f relatively large
size or whether they are small firms that are merging to be large enough for an IPO.
Roll-ups are likely to have less externalities among units o f the firm than single unit
firms and more profit centers [Christie, Joye, and Watts (1998)]. Although roll-ups do

14
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not have operating histories as combined firms, for this study at least one o f the
individual firms is mature (over five years o f operations).
The evidence presented later is that these firms frequently contract with an
outside manager to oversee the consolidation o f these various businesses.

The

previous owners o f the individual companies then have management roles at the
subsidiary or division level, since that is where their expertise lies. These prior owners
are often members o f the board o f directors and have considerable retained ownership.
It is also likely that a new outside manager hired to head the firm owns a much
smaller percentage o f the resulting company stock than do the previous owners.
Therefore, these roll-up firms are more likely to face the agency problems found in
seasoned public firms.

Interests of manager-shareholders and other shareholders

become less closely aligned as the manager’s stake decreases and ownership becomes
more diluted. Roll-ups appear to be more complex, relative to other IPOs, with the
potential for greater monitoring costs and differential compensation.
2.2

Growth, Use o f Proceeds, and Risk
Each IPO prospectus includes a section titled "Use o f Proceeds". This section

lists specific uses and related dollar amounts for the proceeds from the offering. An
examination of the planned uses o f the capital raised by the IPO provides additional
information about the firm's investment opportunities and decisions.
There are many reasons why a firm chooses to go public. The cash infusion can
be used for a variety o f purposes, but two primary purposes are:

(1) to finance

investment for expansion, and (2) to retire debt. An IPO must list its uses o f proceeds

15
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in the offering prospectus. Examining these uses provides insight into the firm’s
growth plans and prospects.
This study categorizes the uses o f proceeds from the offering into four groups.
This is done to examine the relation between the uses o f proceeds from the offering
and the growth proxy.6 The presence (1,0) o f a particular use disclosed for each firm
is collected and categorized as: (1) creating growth options, (2) exercising growth
options, (3) retiring debt, and (4) other uses. The “creating growth options” category
represents a firm’s planned use for R&D. The “exercising growth options” category
includes planned uses for working capital, capital expenditures, current and future
acquisitions, sales and marketing, and general corporate purposes. The “other uses”
category includes uses for S-corporation distributions, letters o f credit, reorganization
costs, and preferred dividends.
The first two categories o f planned uses, “creating growth options” and
“exercising growth options,” are future oriented. Thus, positive relations with the
growth proxy are expected for both categories. The third category, “retiring debt,” is
related to correcting the capital structure o f the firm. The relation between debt and
growth has both a mathematical and economic explanation. The mathematical relation
is based on changes in the growth proxy when debt is decreased. Both the numerator
and denominator o f the proxy decrease and if the growth proxy is greater than I prior
to debt retirement, growth will decrease after debt retirement. From an economic

6 The growth proxy is (market value o f equity + book value o f debt) / book value o f assets.

16

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

perspective, high growth firms are expected to have low debt because (a) human
capital and R&D expenditures are poor collateral, (b) stock return volatility is high for
these firms, and (c) debt covenants inhibit change [Smith and Watts (1992)]. Since the
retirement o f debt only effects the growth proxy after the retirement occurs, the
disclosure o f such a use o f proceeds is not expected to have any relation with growth.
Except for letters o f credit, examples o f uses that are included in the “other uses”
category are backward looking. Therefore, this category is not expected to be related
to growth.
2.2.1 Risk and Proceeds
The uses o f proceeds convey information about firms future plans for
investments. These growth plans are also related to risk, i.e., the types o f investments
a firm makes affects the riskiness o f the firm.

Therefore, firm-specific risk is

endogenous.
A proxy for ex ante risk that is examined in this study is the number o f risk
factors listed in the prospectus [Feltham, Hughes and Simunic (1991)].

Over the

years, the SEC has changed their recommendations and rules regarding the number
and types o f risk factors to disclose, hi Ritter (1991), a number o f firms had zero risk
factors disclosed.

The minimum number o f risk factors in this study is eleven.

Examination o f the actual risk factors in this sample indicates that there are many
factors that every firm includes in their prospectus. This increase in "boilerplate" risk
factors may decrease the variability between firms o r just shift the mean. Examples o f
"boilerplate" factors are dilution o f ownership, dependence on key personnel,
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fluctuations in operating results, absence o f prior trading market, broad management
discretion in allocation o f net proceeds, shares eligible for future sale, and anti
takeover provisions. Therefore, an alternative proxy for ex ante risk (or uncertainty) is
tested. This proxy is the number o f uses o f proceeds listed in the prospectus [Beatty
and Ritter (1986)].

Beatty and Ritter (1986) use this measure because the SEC

requires riskier issuers to provide more detail on the uses o f proceeds.
Stock return volatility is used as an ex p o st risk measure. The number o f postIPO monthly stock returns used in calculations ranges from 9 to 30 months, with a
median o f 21 months. If the ex ante measures o f risk perform as the SEC would like
them to, they should explain ex p o st risk, volatility.

Therefore, this relation is

examined. Growth is included in these tests because o f the link between risk and
growth.
2 3 Compensation
Compensation contracts are used to help align the interests o f management with
those o f shareholders. In the manager-shareholder contract, the owner-manager is
viewed as the agent and the shareholder as the principal. Principals are concerned
with the manager’s contribution, via effort or ability, toward maximizing the value o f
the firm. The agency problem arises because the principal has limited observability o f
the agent’s actions and must therefore impute the agent’s actions based on outcomes
[Jensen and Meckling (1976)].
The limited observability o f effort implies an uneven information environment
between principals and agents. Therefore, perfect risk-sharing between the principal
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and agent is not possible because the agent’s welfare depends on the output achieved
[Holmstrom (1979)]. An agent must be compensated for bearing this additional risk.
When the contract goals are to align the manager’s incentives with those o f the
shareholder, agency costs arise because managers have to be compensated for bearing
additional risk [Antle and Smith (1985)].
In summary, this section discusses theoretical issues related to compensation
contracting. The compensation function discussed in the next three subsections is
modeled as:
CEO Compensation = / (IOS, CEO Characteristics, IPO Types).
Predictions are made about the relations between CEO compensation and IOS, i.e.,
size, growth, firm performance, and risk; CEO compensation and CEO characteristics
and ownership, i.e., whether the CEO is Chairman o f the Board, equity ownership o f
the CEO, equity ownership o f directors and officers, CEO tenure, and whether the
CEO is a founder; and, CEO compensation and IPO classifications, i.e., whether the
firm is a roll-up or a start-up. A summary o f these hypotheses is presented in Table 1.
To allow comparability with prior research, these hypotheses are tested using
several measures of CEO compensation. These measures are (I) CEO's prior year
cash salary, (2) CEO base salary per employment agreement, (3) CEO’s prior year
cash bonus, (4) CEO’s prior year cash bonus as a proportion o f cash compensation
(sum o f prior year salary and cash bonus), and (5) CEO's stock option values.
Recent changes in SEC disclosure requirements allow researchers to calculate
the value o f CEO stock options. The stock-based compensation component used in
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compensation studies is the change in the value o f the CEO’s stock options from one
year to the next. The calculation o f the value o f CEO stock options is discussed in
section 3.1.
2.3.1 Compensation and Investment Opportunities
This section develops testable hypotheses based upon theory and the relation
between compensation and the IOS.

Research on the relation between executive

compensation and a firm's investment opportunities reveals that compensation is crosssectionally related to firm size, growth, prior performance, and firm risk [Smith and
Watts (1992); Gaver and Gaver (1993); Baber et al. (1996)].

The compensation

function in these studies is modeled as:
Compensation = / (Size, Growth, Regulation, Firm Performance, Risk).7
These studies recognize the endogeneity o f the right-hand side variables, e.g.,
future growth depends on incentives. Since these variables are internal to the firm and
underlying exogenous factors are difficult to identify, these variables are treated as
predetermined.
A firm’s IOS is defined as its prospective investment opportunities and
associated payoff distributions [Smith and Watts (1992)]. A firm's IOS is driven by
firm-specific investment in “specialized physical and human capital” [Smith and Watts
(1992)]. A firm’s IOS is multidimensional, and includes the type o f knowledge the
firm produces, production and information externalities among a firm's investments,

7 Since firms in regulated industries are excluded from this study, regulation is not discussed.
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technological and demand uncertainty, regulation, type o f customers and employees,
asset specificity, product and other tortious liabilities, and tax structure (domestic and
foreign) [Christie, Joye and Watts (1998); Christie (1998)]. Christie, Joye and Watts
(1998) argue that these IOS characteristics are related to firm size, growth, and risk.
Using industry-level data from 1965 to 1985, Smith and Watts (1992) find that
measures o f the IOS, i.e., availability o f growth options and firm size, are related to a
firm’s financing, dividend, and executive compensation policies. Gaver and Gaver
(1993) and Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang (1996), using firm level data, extend Smith
and Watts (1992) with similar results. Baber et al. (1996) examine the use and value
o f stock options, whereas Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) only
document the existence of stock option plans. These three ex post studies use different
definitions o f executive compensation and different IOS measures.
Using an ex ante approach that focuses on the set o f permissible contracts
instead o f actual remuneration, Kole (1997) provides evidence that the terms o f
incentive stock arrangements vary systematically with the characteristics o f the assets
being managed. The results o f the IOS studies discussed above support a relationship
between a firm’s IOS and its corporate policies. Unfortunately, there is no consensus
on the proper proxies to represent the IOS.
Prior evidence finds that larger firms have greater executive compensation
[Smith and Watts (1992); Gaver and Gaver (1993)]. This supports theory that larger
firms are more complex, executives have an increased span o f supervision and control,
and that managerial decisions affect greater amounts o f resources.
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The supply o f

executives with the talent and experience to manage these larger firms is scarce in the
managerial labor market. Therefore, a higher equilibrium wage for executives with
expertise in managing large firms is required to attract and retain these individuals
[Smith and Watts (1992)]. Size is usually included in contracting studies as a control
variable. Predicted signs for compensation components are:
Pred.
Sign

Independent
Variable

Dependent
Variable

Size
(Sales)

Salary

+

Larger firms more complex; therefore, higher salary.

Bonus

+

Larger firms more complex; therefore higher bonus.

Stock
Options

0

No effect.

Explanation

Prior research predicts that executive compensation varies positively with
investment opportunities, i.e., the larger the proportion o f firm value represented by
growth options, the greater the manager’s compensation [Gaver and Gaver (1993);
Smith and Watts (1992)]. The results from these studies support theories regarding
increased compensation for greater risk and the exceptional skill required by top
management. Some studies show that firms that feature a greater frequency o f stockrelated compensation are associated with projects having longer time horizons, since
future cash flows are better linked to stock returns [Lambert and Larcker (1987);
Gaver and Gaver (1993)]. These findings imply that accounting numbers may be
limited in their ability to reflect expected cash flows, while market measures may be
more sensitive to managerial actions that have fixture period consequences. In other
words, timing differences between managerial actions and outcomes (subsequent cash
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flows) vary with the nature o f the actions, e.g., a credit granting action that results in a
sale has a short time horizon, whereas, revenues from investments in R&D are likely
to take much longer.
Compensation theory also predicts that firms with more growth options
(relatively fewer assets-in-place) use stock-based compensation more frequently
because management's performance is more difficult to monitor [Baber et al. (1996);
Gaver and Gaver (1993)]. Evidence supports predictions that high growth or research
intensive firms are more likely than low growth (low R&D) firms to use equity-based
compensation plans

[Clinch (1991); Smith and Watts (1992); Gaver and Gaver

(1993); Kole (1997); Baber et al. (1996)]. Other studies find that stock price is less
informative than accounting earnings in high-growth firms [Clinch (1991); Bizjak et al
(1993)]. This is important for the present study since IPOs are typically high growth
firms. Baber et al. (1996) separate firms into those with high and low investment
opportunities and find that the values o f noncash compensation components are large
and that their cross-sectional variation is high relative to cash compensation. Testable
hypotheses regarding growth and compensation are:
Independent
Variable
Growth

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Pred.
Sien
0

Bonus

0

Stock
Options

+

Explanation

No effect.
Accounting-based performance less useful for high
growth firms.
High growth firms harder to monitor, so need ex
ante incentive to maximize value.

s Baber et al. (1996) construct an IOS measure using factor analysis on four variables. The partition
between high and low IOS is determined by whether the EOS factor is above or below the median.
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Investors need information both for valuation purposes and to monitor agents
[Paul (1992)]. Accounting information, a commonly used basis for the measure o f
firm performance, serves both decision-making and stewardship roles (performance
evaluation and compensation) [Gjesdal (1981)]. Performance evaluation should be
based on firm specific events that are under the manager's control and that reflect the
value added by the manager [Paul (1992)].

Because accounting earnings numbers

predominantly reflect firm-specific events, they are used most often in executive
compensation contracts [Sloan (1993)].

Thus, firm performance is an economic

determinant o f CEO compensation [Murphy (1985)].

Compensation is usually

contingent on more than one performance measure, and research predicts that the
relative importance o f alternative measures should be a function o f their precision and
sensitivity to the manager’s performance [Banker and Datar (1989)]. A signal that is
more sensitive to changes in the manager’s effort should receive greater weight.
Therefore, the informational properties o f alternative measures must be determined
based on the environment and characteristics o f each firm. As the signal gets noisier,
alternative measures are substituted. Ely (1991) shows that using several accounting
metrics to capture financial performance better explains compensation across diverse
industries.

This suggests that the value o f accounting numbers used in executive

compensation contracts differs depending upon the firm's circumstances.
Additionally, the financial performance measures used in compensation
contracts have different incentive effects depending on whether they focus on the long
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or short-term performance o f the firm.

Accounting measures are often positively

related to annual bonus rewards, whereas stock measures are related to long-term
incentive awards whose value depends on the number o f stock option grants, exercise
price, vesting, and stock price. Baber et al. (1996) find that the relation between
compensation and accounting return is positive and significant only for cash bonuses.
The performance incentive should motivate the manager to increase the value o f the
firm.

When accounting numbers do not readily reflect changes in firm value, the

primary performance measure will be stock-based even though this is a noisy measure
o f managerial performance.

Stock-based measures o f performance are subject to

market-wide shocks that affect firm value, but are beyond the manager's control.9
Accounting-based performance measures are used when they provide better measures
o f value added by the manager.

Accounting-based performance measures include

earnings per share, return on assets, return on equity, and pre-tax profits. Stock-based
performance measures include total stockholder returns and stock performance relative
to a firm's industry peer group [Bushman et al. (1996)]. The following predictions are
made regarding compensation and firm performance:

9 Recontracting can reduce the downside risk o f these market-wide shocks. This was the approach taken
by many firms after the 1987 stock market crash. Many firms lowered the exercise prices o f stock
options to keep their incentive/reward mechanism meaningful [Wall Street Journal (1988)].
Recontracting is also commonly done when the price decline is firm specific [Byrne, Business Week,
Oct. 12, 1998].
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Independent
Variable
Firm
performance
(Return on
assets=ROA)

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Pred.
Sign
0

Bonus

0/+

Stock
Options

+

Explanation

Fixed component of compensation.
Firm-specific, incentive and pay for performance
measure for the largest firms, zero otherwise.
Options more valuable when firm has done well in
past (reflected in both stock value and ROA).

Firm risk is also relevant in modeling CEO compensation and is expected to
have a positive relation with compensation. Managers are risk averse and are to be
compensated more for bearing greater risk [Antle and Smith (1985); Smith and Watts
(1992)].

Results from prior research are mixed.

Smith and Watts (1992), after

controlling for growth and size, find that risk is not significant in their compensation
regressions. This finding is inconsistent with theory and intuition. Core, Holthausen,
and Larcker (1999) observe a negative relationship between risk and CEO
compensation.

On the other hand, risk is significantly positive with respect to

executive compensation in Cyert, et al. (1997), while controlling for growth
opportunities and firm size. These conflicting results may be partially associated with
the risk proxy used in each study. Predictions are:
Independent
Variable
Firm risk:
volatility of
stock returns
[Risk (Vol)]

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Pred.
Sign
+

Explanation

Higher compensation for bearing greater risk.

Bonus

0

No effect.

Stock
Options

0

No effect.
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2.3.2 Compensation and CEO Characteristics
This section develops hypotheses on the relation between CEO compensation
and CEO characteristics and e q u ity ownership. These predictions can be based on two
theoretically different viewpoints.

One perspective is that the predictions reflect

efficient contracting, whereas the other perspective is that managers engage in
opportunism.

These efficiency and opportunism explanations are not mutually

exclusive, though. Christie and Zimmerman (1994) argue that expected opportunism
exists and is efficient.

Rational shareholders anticipate expected opportunism and

either contract it away or price-protect themselves. Therefore, the manager bears the
agency costs. This gives the manager an incentive to minimize expected opportunism.
So the use o f the term opportunism means the unexpected component. For a sample o f
IPOs that have new contracts, opportunism is expected to be small.
A

firm's

compensation.

ownership

and

governance

structure

also

influences

CEO

The Board o f Directors has decision-making authority and a

monitoring role. According to Jensen (1993), the CEO and Chairman o f the Board
should be different individuals in order for the firm to have an effective and
independent board. Empirical evidence shows that CEO compensation for non-IPO
firms is higher when the CEO is also the Chairman o f the Board [Core, Holthausen,
and Larcker (1999); Cyert et al. (1997); Brickley et al. (1997)]. This evidence leads to
the following testable hypotheses for IPOs:
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Independent
Variable
CEO is
Chairman of
the Board
(CEOCOB)

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Pred.
Sien
-t-

Greater responsibility, higher pay.

Bonus

+

Greater responsibility, higher pay.

Stock
Options

0

No effect.

Explanation

The CEO's equity ownership is related to the power o f the CEO and affects the
degree o f monitoring required [Jensen and Murphy (1990); Mehran (1995)]. CEO
salary and bonus compensation has been found to be increasing in his or her equity
ownership, but decreasing when the CEO is the largest shareholder [Cyert et al.
(1997)].

The relation between CEO compensation and equity ownership is

ambiguous, though. An opportunistic explanation is that if the CEO has considerable
equity ownership, then his or her power may be formidable and thus allow extraction
o f greater compensation. On the other hand, the more equity ownership the CEO has,
the stronger the link between CEO wealth and stock performance. This also subjects
the CEO to increased amounts o f firm-specific risk. Therefore, the CEO is expected to
receive less incentive-based compensation that is tied to stock price [Sloan (1993)].
This implies greater base salary and eamings-based incentives. Since it is difficult to
predict the weighting o f salary versus bonus in this situation, it becomes an empirical
issue. The efficiency story is that if the CEO is under-diversified, then he or she will
require a risk premium in the form o f increased base salary. Also, a risk premium

28

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

exceeding his or her reservation wage is required to attract and retain the CEO.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is posited for IPOs:
Independent
Variable
CEO’s equity
ownership %
(CEOOWN)

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Bonus
Stock
Options

Pred. Explanation
Sign
+
Fixed component as risk premium.
0
-

No effect.
Substitution effect—the more stock owned by CEO,
the less options are needed for incentives.

The equity ownership o f directors and officers is likely to affect the degree o f
monitoring firms require [Jensen (1993); Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)].
Increased ownership by the board provides an incentive to monitor and collect the
necessary information. Also, board ownership can be influential in control contests
with the CEO. This is supported by the negative association between ownership o f
officers and directors and CEO compensation for non-IPO firms [Core, Holthausen,
and Larcker (1999); Cyert et al. (1997)]. The following predictions are made:
Independent
Variable
Equity
ownership %
o f directors
and officers
(DIROWN)

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Bonus
Stock
Options

Pred. Explanation
Sign
0
No effect.

0
-

No effect.
Increased incentive to directly monitor, so
substitution effect.

CEO tenure is included in some compensation models, but results are mixed.
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that CEO tenure does not explain any o f the
cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, but Cyert et al. (1997) find that tenure
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is significantly positive for salary and bonuses, but insignificant when equity-based
components are included in compensation. From an efficient contracting perspective,
a positive relation between tenure and cash compensation may reflect rewards for
staying with the firm. First, the firm retains the specialized knowledge o f the CEO and
knowledge increases over time.

Second, golden handcuff clauses reinforce value

maximization by encouraging a longer horizon with the firm .10 The opportunistic
explanation is that compensation is higher due to the CEO's increased influence with
the board or managerial entrenchment. Predictions are:
Independent
Variable
CEO’s tenure
with the firm
(TENURE)

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Pred.
Sign
+

Explanation

Bonus

0

Incentive to acquire firm-specific human capital.
Thus, increased knowledge and experience, so
higher pay.
No effect.

Stock
Options

0

No effect.

Whether the CEO is also a founder may have some explanatory power in the
level and components o f compensation [Kole (1997)].

Owner-managers may be

accustomed to perquisite consumption and may not be inclined to decrease these
benefits. It is expected that these former owner/managers will change their behavior
regarding perks when the offering brings in outside owners. One way in which these
prior owner-managers can maintain their utility maximizing behavior is to increase
their base salary as a substitute for previously consumed perks. The form and amount

10 Golden handcuffs are deferred compensation packages that executives forfeit if they leave the firm
prior to vesting [Megginson (1997)].
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o f compensation should depend on the subsequent management role o f the owner, the
percentage o f retained ownership held by the owner, and his or her risk aversion.
Since it is difficult to predict the effect that a founder CEO has on compensation, it is
used as a control variable.
Independent
Variable
CEO is a
founder
(FOUNDER)

2 3 .3

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Pred.
Sign
?

Explanation

Control variable.

Bonus

?

Control variable.

Stock
Options

?

Control variable.

Compensation and IPO Classifications
This section develops hypotheses regarding the relation between CEO

compensation and IPO firm characteristics based on agency theory, relations regarding
investment opportunities and growth, and certain corporate governance characteristics.
Most o f an IPO’s value is represented by the value o f options on future investment
opportunities [Rao (1989)]. Thus, different risk factors, assets in place, length o f
operating history, future growth plans and prospects, and relative levels o f R&D
expenditures will affect the component weightings and complexities o f compensation
contracts used for individual firms.
There are few studies on compensation contracts in IPOs.

Beatty and Zajac

(1994) analyze managerial incentives, risk sharing, and monitoring in 435 firms that
went public in 1984. Their study focuses on variables representing noncash executive
compensation, managerial ownership, and board structure. They measure noncash
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executive compensation as the percentage o f total compensation derived from stock
options plus the change in value o f the stock held by the executive in the pre-IPO year.
Independent variables in this noncash compensation regression include two size
measures (sales and market value o f equity), firm age, manager’s age and risk.
However, their results suffer from collinearity and model misspecification (omitted
variables).
Mature firms are larger, older and less risky than start-ups. If executives o f these
firms have retained considerable ownership in the company, then long-term incentives
to maximize value exist. Compensation contracts in these types o f firms will include a
bonus component based on accounting performance to cover short-term incentives.
Although this is a newly public firm, it is likely that, when compared with other types
o f EPOs, this firm is in a relatively later stage o f investment. That is, they are likely to
be exercising growth options rather than creating them. These types o f firms are
expected to have higher levels o f assets-in-place and longer operating histories that
improve accounting numbers as a signal for determining the value added by the CEO.
The agency problems discussed earlier regarding roll-ups arise from separation
o f ownership and management and the complexity o f combining several businesses.
The monitoring and incentive alignment is more complex, and contracts depend on
whether an outside manager is hired as CEO or whether one o f the prior owners takes
a controlling role. Long-term incentives for an outside manager may be addressed by
compensation contracts with considerable stock-based components. This aligns the
CEO's interest with those o f the shareholders. It is expected that the prevalence of
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stock-based versus accounting-based components will vary depending upon the
governance structure adopted and the equity ownership o f the CEO.
If a firm is a roll-up, a positive relation with CEO salary is expected. This
prediction is related to the complexity o f combining and operating a diverse set o f
firms and lines o f business. Their internal organizations are more complex, relative to
other IPOs. There is no reason to expect that incentive compensation, whether bonus
or stock options, is any different from other mature firms. Expectations regarding roll
ups and compensation components are:
Independent
Variable
Roll-ups
(DR)

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Pred. Explanation
Sign
+
Complexity; multi-dimensional firms merging.

Bonus

0

No effect.

Stock
Options

0

No effect.

Section 2.1.1 discusses the reasons why accounting earnings for start-ups are
low or negative initially. Tying managerial incentives to accounting earnings for start
ups could be counterproductive. Basing compensation on accounting earnings could
provide an incentive for managers to cut R&D, advertising, or other discretionary
expenditures to increase accounting earnings, rather than increase firm value.

For

start-ups that are investing in R&D, the future benefits o f this investment are not likely
to be reflected in accounting earnings for a considerable period o f time. In an efficient
market, stock prices reflect the perceived future impact o f R&D immediately (based on
publicly available information). Thus, the primary measure used in these firms will be
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stock-based even though this is a noisy measure o f managerial performance because it
includes market-wide shocks that effect firm value.

Therefore,

incentive

compensation for start-ups should be more heavily weighted towards stock-based
components than proportions found in mature firms.
As stated earlier, firms that are going public are growth oriented and o f high risk.
Efficient incentive arrangements compensate executives for greater risks [Antle and
Smith (1985)]. Gaver and Gaver (1993) find that executives in higher-risk firms do
have higher base salaries.

It is difficult to disentangle this risk story from the

assumption that it is harder to manage growth companies than it is to manage assets in
place. This implies that managers with expertise in managing growth are relatively
scarce in the managerial labor market and therefore have a higher reservation wage. If
IPOs are categorized into relative riskiness or relative growth opportunities, i.e., start
ups versus non start-ups, and if it is more difficult to manage high growth firms, then
based on prior research using large firm samples, it is expected that CEO base salaries
in higher-risk (high growth) firms will be significantly greater than for lower-risk (low
growth) firms. On the other hand, start-up firms have limited operating history and are
incurring high start-up costs. Lower cash flows are expected during this time which
may affect the amount o f salary paid to CEOs. After controlling for size and growth,
though, there is no expectation that start-ups have different salary levels from mature
firms. The following predictions are made for start-up firms:
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Independent
Variable
Start-ups
CDS)

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Pred. Explanation
Sign
0
No effect.

Bonus

-

Stock
Options

-t-

Accounting numbers not a useful performance
measure, so stock options are substituted.
Accounting numbers not a useful performance
measure, so stock options are substituted.

A summary o f the hypotheses discussed in section 2.3 are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Compensation Predictions

Independent
Variable
Size
(Sales)

Dependent
Variable
Salary

Bonus

Growth

Firm
performance
(ROA)

Firm risk:
volatility of
Stock Returns
Risk (Vol)

CEO is
Chairman of
the Board
(CEOCOB)

CEO’s equity
ownership %
(CEOOWN)

Stock
Options
Salary

Partia (Ceteris Paribus)
Pred. Sign
Explanation
Found *
+
+
Larger firms more complex; therefore,
higher salary.
+
+
Larger firms more complex; therefore
higher bonus.
0
0
No effect.
0

0

No effect.

Bonus

0

0

Stock
Options

+

+

Salary

0

0

Accounting-based performance less
useful for high growth firms.
High growth firms harder to monitor, so
need ex ante incentive to maximize
value.
Fixed component of compensation.

Bonus

0/+

0/+

Stock
Options

+

0/+

Salary

+

+■

Bonus

0

0

Firm-specific, incentive and pay for
performance measure for the largest
firms, zero otherwise.
Options more valuable when firm has
done well in past (reflected in both stock
value and ROA).
Higher compensation for bearing greater
risk.
No effect.

Stock
Options
Salary

0

0

No effect.

+

0

Greater responsibility, higher pay.

Bonus

+

+

Greater responsibility, higher pay.

Stock
Options
Salary

0

0

No effect.

+

-t-

Fixed component as risk premium.

Bonus

0

0

No effect.

0

Substitution effect—the more stock
owned by CEO, the less options are
needed for incentives.

Stock
Options

36

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(Table I continued)
Equity
ownership %
of directors
and officers
(DIROWN)
CEO’s tenure
(TENURE)

CEO is a
founder
(FOUNDER)

Roll-up
(DR)

Start-up
(DS)

Salary

0

0

No effect.

Bonus

0

+

No effect.

Stock
Options
Salary

•

0

+

+

Bonus

0

0

Increased incentive to directly monitor, so
substitution effect.
Incentive to acquire firm-specific human
capital, thus, increased knowledge and
experience, so higher pay.
No effect.

Stock
Options
Salary

0

0

No effect.

?

-

Control variable.

Bonus

?

0

Control variable.

Stock
Options
Salary

?

0

Control variable.

+

0

Bonus

0

-

Complexity, multi-dimensional firms
merging.
No effect.

Stock
Options
Salary

0

0

No effect.

0

0

No effect.

Bonus

Accounting numbers not a useful
performance measure, so stock options are
substituted.
+
+
Stock
Accounting numbers not a useful
Options
performance measure, so stock options are
substituted.
a
Sign founc is for the ful model without interaction terms. For salary, this is column 4 of
Table 13; for bonus, column 6 o f Table 15; and for stock option values, column 4 of
Table 18.
Pred. sign = “0” indicates that the estimate is not expected to be statistically different from
zero.
Pred. sign = “?” indicates that no prediction is made about the direction of the effect.
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3. SAMPLE SELECTION, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AND VARIABLE
DEFINITIONS
Since May 6, 1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires
mandatory electronic filing for registration statements, proxy statements, and other
SEC filings. Based on data collected from Hoover’s IPO Central and EDGAR Online,
over 1,400 companies filed offering prospectuses between May 6, 1996 and February
5, 1998. O f those that filed, 841 were documented as trading for the first time by
February 5, 1998. This study is based on a random sample o f 207 firms from the
population o f 841 trading firms. Table 2 presents sample selection procedures.
Offerings in regulated industries (banks, insurance companies) and Real Estate
Investment Trusts are excluded [Gaver and Gaver (1993); Baber et al. (1996);
Mikkelson et al. (1997)]. Other exclusions are: (1) firms that did not start trading or
data was unavailable, (2) offerings that include multiple classes o f common stock with
different voting rights; (3) unit offerings that include warrants; and (4) subsidiaries or
spin-offs o f public companies.

Table 2 presents the frequency o f each o f these

exclusions. The final sample results in 111 firms.
Ninety-eight sample firms are listed on NASDAQ, and fourteen are listed on
either NYSE or AMEX. Table 3 presents the sample distribution by one-digit SIC
code. Forty-one percent o f the sample firms are in service industries. The distribution
o f the sample by IPO type is presented in o f Table 4. The IPO classification results in
36 start-ups and 75 mature firms o f which 18 are roll-ups.
Descriptive information not presented in tables indicates that 37 firms (33.3%)
have sales o f stock by shareholders that acquired their shares prior to the IPO. In
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Table 2: Sample Selection Procedures
Selection criteria

No. of firms

Random sample (population=841 firms)
Firms eliminated:
Not trading or data unavailable
Banks, [nsurance, REIT
Multiple classes of common stock with different voting rights
Offering is in units and warrants
Majority-owned by public company or spin-off

207

Final sample

ill

(13)
(23)
(17)
(25)
£18)

Table 3: Sample distribution by one-digit SIC code
SIC Code

Industry

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

Primary
Manufacturing (nondurables)
Manufacturing (durables)
Transportation
Wholesalers and retailers
Financial services
Business services
Consumer services

Frequency
7
8
24
8
19
1
23
21
ill

Percentage
6.3
7.2
21.6
7.2
17.1
0.9
20.8
18.9
11M

Table 4: Sample distribution by IPO type
IPO Type a

Frequency

Percentage

51.4
Mature
57
16.2
Roll-up
18
32.4
Start-up
36
100.0
Total
HI
Start-ups are firms with less than five years of operating history. Mature firms have five
or more years of operating history. Roll-ups are mature firms, i.e., at least one individual
firm in the roll-up has five or more years of operating history.
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57.7% o f firms, the same person holds the CEO and Chairman o f the Board positions.
Almost half o f the CEOs are founders. Only 27.8% o f the roll-up CEOs are founders,
which supports the assertion that these types o f IPOs are complex and contract with an
outsider to manage the combination o f several firms.
CEO employment agreement dates are disclosed for 59 firms and indicate they
are current (the oldest employment agreement is dated 1994). All o f the sample firms
have stock option plans either in place or to be effective with the offering. CEOs in
10.8% o f the firms exercised options during the last full fiscal year prior to the
offering.

At the date o f the offering, 40.5% o f CEOs had vested, in-the-money

options.

None o f the sample firms have granted restricted stock, phantom stock,

performance shares, or performance units, and only nine firms have a long-term
performance plan in place. This is consistent with stock ownership being a substitute
mechanism for long term performance plans. Nearly all firms state their intention not
to pay dividends in the foreseeable future.
Table 5 presents sample descriptive statistics. The median total stock ownership
dilution represented by the offering is 30.03%. The median stake o f CEO equity
ownership is 15.1% prior to the offering and declines to 10.2% immediately after the
offering.11 The median equity ownership stake for officers and directors as a group
(excluding the CEO) decreases from 36.15% to 26.2%.12 These statistics indicate that

11 The median ownership in Core etal. (1998) for 205 large firms is 0.10 percent.
12 The median ownership in Cyert et al. (1997) for 1,671 large and small firms is 4.88%.
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managerial ownership is substantial, which implies that incentives for board members
to monitor are in place for these firms.
Comparing the various size statistics in Table 5 with descriptive statistics from
samples used in other compensation studies indicate that the IPO firms in this study
are substantially smaller.

For example, mean (median) sales in this study are

$72,331,553 ($25,545,000). The high-IOS firms in Baber et al. (1996) are several
times larger, with mean (median) sales o f $1,001,000,000 ($191,000,000).
The earlier assertion that many o f these IPOs have low or negative earnings is
supported by the mean (median) net income o f -$377,479 (+$801,000). This also
results in mean ROA being negative. The statistic, property, plant, and equipment as a
percentage o f total assets, gives information about the assets in place.

The mean

(median) is 24.76% (16.56%), but the range broad (< 1% to almost 97%).

This

average, combined with descriptive information on growth, indicates that the firms in
this study are not fixed asset intensive. The minimum growth proxy is greater than 1,
confirming that assets-in-place are low.
3.1 Variable Definitions
This section discusses the dependent and independent variables used to test the
hypotheses developed in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3. The variables fall into three categories:
(1) compensation measures, (2) IOS measures:

size, growth proxies, firm

performance, and risk proxies, and (3) CEO characteristics and ownership. Some o f
the variables are based on prior research, whereas others are unique to this study.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on Selected Variables
Variable
Ownership
Offering as a % of Shares Outstanding *
Shs, Offered by Owners as a % of Tot. Shs, Offered
CEO Equity Ownership Percentage (alter IPO)
Change in CEO Equity Ownership Percentage
Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % (alter IPO)d
Change in Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % i
Proceeds
Estimated Proceeds from Offering *
Net Proceeds / BV of Assets Prior to IPO
Size
Sales
Book Value of Assets
MV of Equity at Close of 1st Day of Trading *
Net Property, Plant & Equipment
Working Capital
BV of Debt (excluding redeemable stock)
Number of Employees
Shares Offered *
Compensation
CEO Salary (prior FY)
CEO Bonus (prior FY)
CEO Stock Option Value (at IPO price)
CEO Salary per Employment Agreement
Salary Agreement as a % of Prior Year Salary

Mean

Nk

Minimum

111
111
111
111
111

no

5.38%
0
0.5%
-42.97%
0.00%
-56.80%

32,13%
7.38%
18.52%
-8.46%
27.75%
-12.08%

111
111

$3,868,000
0.16

111
0
111
$372,920
111 $15,505,000
$4,400
111
111 -$17,895,000
111
$182,348
HI
4
111
1,100,000
95
95
65
80
64

$20,000
0
0
$80,000
62.74%

Median

Maximum

Std Dev

30.03%
0
10.20%
-4.90%
26.20%
-9.95%

73.27%
51.28%
76.40%
23.00%
74.30%
42.00%

13.02
12.67
19.71
10.54
18.12
12.13

$33,058,888
1.97

$25,135,000
1.06

$194,900,000
37.76

$72,331,533
$58,740,858
$198,890,851
$20,568,291
$8,692,440
$53,453,475
1,349
3,241,008

$25,545,000
$23,491,000
$113,930,000
$4,139,000
$3,887,000
$13,745,234
322
2,700,000

$210,280
$118,221
$4,937,605
$252,967
130.83%

$182,333
$36,000
$1,668,308
$205,500
111.73%

27,446,502
3.77

$942,800,000
$1,181,800,000
$3,441,271,025
$289,431,000
$121,353,945
$1,395,200,000
28,000
13,622,500

130,415,098
131,621,262
372,800,615
51,467,681
18,398,786
152,213,899
3,774
1,760,764

$600,000
$1,816,439
$65,629,992
$1,375,000
500,00%

108,091
258,984
12,042,593
171,831
63.24
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(Table 5 continued)

*
b

0
d
*

Variable
Nb
Minimum
Mean
Median
Maximum
Std Dev
Past Performance
Net Income
111 -$72,409,000
-$377,479
$801,000
$83,000,000
13,684,902
ROA (Nl / BV Assets Prior to IPO)
-1.93
0.02
0.40
111
0.48
-0.15
Growth
Growth Proxyc
111
5.66
1.57
10.70
132.18
15.50
Other Characteristics
Volatility of Post-IPO Stock Returns0
0.08
111
0.22
0.22
0.45
0.08
Number of Risk Factors in Prospectus
11
19.89
20
111
30
3.55
CEO Tenure in Years
111
0
6.59
28
5
6.50
Property, Plant & Equip as a % of Total Assets
0.63%
111
24.76%
16.56%
96.65%
22.55
Assumes no exercise of the underwriters' over-allotment option and includes shares offered through private placements concurrent with IPO,
Variables with N < 111 are due to missing values, Most of these missing values result from non-disclosure of executive employment agreements and no
salary history for new CEOs. Zero minimum values are either due to the inapplicability of variables for certain firms or the true value is zero, for
example, several firms did not pay out a bonus,
Defined as (market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets; book value of debt includes redeemable stock. Excluding redeemable
stock does not significantly change the value of the measure.
Excludes CEO ownership.
Ranges from 9 to 30 months of stock returns for individual firms.

Variables associated with firms’ financial statements come from data in the last fiscal
year’s disclosures presented in the offering prospectus.
3.1.1 Compensation Variables
Most executive compensation studies use ex post cash compensation (salary plus
bonus) o f the CEO as the proxy for management compensation [Lambert and Larcker
(1987), Clinch (1991), Sloan (1993), Gaver and Gaver (1993)].13 This is partly due to
the difficulty in obtaining data about the specifics o f compensation contracts. The use
o f this proxy ignores compensation under stock incentive plans, so compensation is
measured with error. However, the availability o f data on compensation components
has been enhanced by the SEC’s expanded disclosure requirement that was effective in
1992. Public companies now report five components o f CEO compensation: salary,
cash bonus, long-term incentive payout, and the value o f stock options and restricted
stock granted during the year. These details allow more precise measures o f CEO
compensation than have been used in prior research.
Compensation variables in this study include CEO’s prior year cash salary, salary
per employment agreement, prior year cash bonus, and the value o f stock options. The
cash components, i.e., salary and bonus, come from the financial statements for the last
fiscal year prior to the IPO.
Compensation studies generally measure stock-based compensation as the value
o f current year option grants plus the change in the value o f prior years’ options

13These compensation variables may be levels of or changes in compensation.
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granted. For a study o f IPOs, there isn’t a market price prior to the IPO, so the
measure o f stock option value includes both the current grants and the full value o f
prior years’ grants. Therefore, the value o f stock options includes exercisable and
unexercisable options held by the CEO.

The formula for valuing the exercisable

options is max. [0, (IPO price - exercise price)] times the number o f shares. The
unexercisable options are valued using the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model
modified for early exercise.14 An examination o f the prospectuses indicates that the
vesting schedule for most o f the stock option grants is about four years. Therefore, the
term to expiration used in the valuation model is 4 years, the risk-free rate is 6%, and
the volatility is an annualized number that is based on 9 to 30 months o f post-IPO
stock returns.

None o f the firms in the sample granted restricted stock and all

compensation information comes from the last amended offering prospectus filed with
the SEC.
3.1.2 IOS Variables
Firm size has been cited as a function o f the firm’s investment opportunity set
and has been used as a surrogate for numerous measures (complexity, risk, political
costs, etc.) in the finance and accounting literatures. The proxy for firm size used in
this study and in most compensation studies is sales revenue. Sensitivity tests are run
on two alternate proxies, log o f sales and book value o f assets.

14 Hemmer et al. (1994) state that substituting the expected term for the actual contract time to maturity
still overstates the value o f the options. They suggest an alternative approach to valuing employees’
stock options which takes into account the probability o f early exercise. Their algorithm is not used in
this study.
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The proxy for growth options is the ratio of the market value o f the firm (market
value o f equity -I- book value o f debt) to the book value o f assets.15 Alternate growth
measures used in sensitivity tests include: (1) the ratio o f net offering proceeds to the
book value o f assets prior to the IPO and (2) the ratio o f market value o f equity + book
value o f long-term debt to book value o f assets [Biqak et al. (1993)]. Market value o f
equity is determined by using the closing price on the first trading day multiplied by
the number o f common shares outstanding.
Compensation models also use an earnings proxy.16 The number used in the
numerator o f this measure varies across studies. Healy (1985) finds that, in large
firms, 52.7 percent o f the company-year observations use earnings before taxes and
33.5 percent use earnings before interest as contract definitions o f earnings. Both
numbers are determined before the deduction for bonus expense. The determination o f
an appropriate accounting return measure for this study is difficult since only a small
number o f firms disclose in the prospectus the definition used in their compensation
contracts (see Table 12). Return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of net income
to the book value o f assets is the firm performance measure used in this study.
Risk proxies used in this study are (1) stock return volatility, (2) the number o f
risk factors disclosed in the prospectus, and (3) the number o f uses o f proceeds
disclosed in the prospectus. Stock return volatility, an ex post risk measure, is based on

15 "This measure is the inverse o f the primary IOS proxy used in Smith and Watts (1992).
16 The accounting return measure used in Smith and Watts (1992) is (operating income + interest
expense)/firm value,.

46

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

firm-specific monthly stock: returns. The number o f available observations ranges
from 9 to 30 months, with a median o f 21 months.
To test the reasonableness o f the number o f risk factors measure, an out-ofsample regression is run using Ritter’s (1991) IPO database. The standard deviation o f
monthly stock returns for three years subsequent to the IPO for firms from Ritter
(1991) is regressed on the number o f risk factors listed in the prospectuses. Results
presented in Table 11 indicate that for both the Ritter sample and the sample used in
this study, the number o f risk factors is a useful predictor o f ex post risk, stock return
volatility.
Another proxy for ex ante risk is also tested. This proxy is the number o f uses o f
proceeds listed in the prospectus [Beatty and Ritter (1986)]. Beatty and Ritter (1986)
use this measure because the SEC requires riskier issuers to provide more detail on the
uses o f proceeds.
3.1.3 CEO Characteristic Variables
Many compensation and IPO studies also include CEO characteristics and
corporate governance variables in their analyses. In addition to managerial ownership
percentages before and after the offering (CEO and officers and directors), other
variables collected are whether the CEO and Chairman o f the Board positions are held
by the same person, CEO tenure, and whether the CEO is a founder of the firm.
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4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
This section presents empirical tests o f hypotheses discussed in Section 2.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) cross-sectional regressions are used in all tests. First,
analyses o f differences in sample structure, i.e., differences between IPO types, are
presented. Second, the use o f proceeds disclosed in prospectuses, the risk proxies, and
IPO type dummies are examined to determine if these variables explain variation in
the growth proxy, (market value o f equity plus book value o f debt) f book value o f
assets.

Third, CEO compensation variables are regressed on determinants o f

compensation that theory supported by evidence finds to be relevant in explaining
compensation variation.
4.1 Sample Structure
Classification o f sample firms by IPO type results in 36 start-ups and 75 mature
firms, of which 18 are roll-ups. A simple way to report several differences in means is
to regress continuous variables on dummy variables representing the IPO types. Thus,
the coefficients on the dummies capture the differences in means.

Differences in

means for start-ups and mature firms are presented in Table 6. Table 7 separates roll
ups from other mature firms and presents differences in means for the three
classifications. The following results are reported for predicted differences between
start-ups and mature firms (section 2.1.1).
The data support the prediction that start-ups are smaller than mature firms.
Variables with significantly negative differences include sales, book value o f assets,
book value o f debt, the size o f the offering, and the number o f employees.

48

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Size

measures that are not significantly different for the two IPO types are market value o f
equity, property, plant, and equipment, and working capital. The differences in means
for the two accounting-related firm performance variables, net income and return on
assets (ROA), are significantly negative for start-ups, supporting the assertion that
these firms are in developmental stages, possibly invest heavily in R&D and/or
marketing, and have high initial operating costs. As predicted, the difference in means
for the growth proxy for start-up firms is significantly positive, confirming that these
firms are either at the extreme end o f the growth continuum or market to book
mismeasures growth. The difference in means for both stock return volatility and the
number o f risk factors is positive and significant for start-ups, confirming the
prediction that these firms are riskier, i.e., exhibit more ex ante and ex p ost risk than
non start-ups. Significantly negative differences include proceeds from the offering
and CEO tenure. These two findings are associated with start-ups being smaller and
younger firms.
The results from the analysis o f differences between the three IPO types in Table
7 offer information on characteristics o f roll-ups. The significantly positive difference
in means on book value o f assets and size o f the offering provide evidence that roll
ups are significantly larger in size and have more assets in place than other mature
firms. They also have the lowest proportion o f growth opportunities among the three
types.
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Table 6: Differences in Means for Start-ups and Mature Firms
Variable s = Bo + Bi Start-up -i-ec
Pred.
Intercept
Coefficient
Sign
(Mature) d
(Start-up)

Variable
Ownership
Offering as a % o f Shares Outstanding *
Shs. Offered by Owners as a % o f Tot. Shs. Offered
CEO Equity Ownership (after IPO)
Change in CEO Equity Ownership Percentage
Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % (after IPO)e
Change in Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % e
Proceeds
Estimated Proceeds from Offering *
Net Proceeds / BV o f Assets Prior to IPO
Size
Sales
Book Value o f Assets
MY o f Equity at Close o f 1st Day o f Trading 4
Net Property, Plant & Equipment
Working Capital
Book Value o f Debt (excluding redeemable stock)
Number o f Employees
Shares Offered4
Compensation
CEO Salary (prior FY)
CEO Bonus (prior FY)
CEO Stock Option Value (at IPO price)
CEO Salary per Employment Agreement
Salary Agreement as a % o f Prior Year Salary
Past Performance
Net Income
ROA (NI / BV Assets Prior to IPO)
Growth
Growth Proxy b
Other Characteristics
Volatility o f Post-IPO Stock Returns£
Number of Risk Factors in Prospectus
CEO Tenure in Years
Property, Plant & Equip as a % o f Total Assets

3431
9.43
19.19
-9 3 I
26.52
-12.82

**
**
**
**
**
**

35,969,708
1.27

**
**

99,720,446
74,047,498
176,962,067
24,899,799
9,763,000
70,870,364
1,856
3,449,577

**
**
**
**
**
»*
**
**

234,583
160,553
5,768,055
280,414
115.11

**
**
**
**
**

1,859,984
-0.01

-

-

+
-

-

-6.73
-632
-2.06
2.62
3.81
234

**
**

-8,975,027
2.16

*
**

-84,449,149
-47,195,471
67,613,752
-13,355,481
-3,300,891
-53,702,074
-1,564
-643,090

**
**

**
**
”

-72,151
-125,671
-2,346,923
-84,453
45.72

**
**
**
**

-6,898,845
-0.43

**
**

6.98

**

+

11.46

**

0.21
19.19
8.15
27.03

**
**
**
**

+
+

0.03
2.17
-4.81
-7.01

**
**
**
*

-

a

Assumes no exercise of the underwriters' over-allotment option and includes shares
offered through private placements concurrent with IPO.
b Defined as (market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets; book
value of debt includes redeemable stock.
c Regressions assume constant variance across subsamples.
d Mature firms = Roll-ups + Other Mature Firms.
e Excludes CEO ownership.
f Ranges from 9 to 30 months o f stock returns for individual firms.
* P-value<0.10;
** P-value < 0.05.
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Table 7: Differences in Means for the Three IPO Types

V ariable

Intercept
(O ther M ature
Firm s)

V ariable i= P0 + Bi Roll-up + )2 S tart-up + e c
Pred.
Coefficient
Pred.
Coefficient
Sign
(Roll-ups)
(Start-ups)
Sign

Prob
<F)

Ownership
Offering as a % o f Shares O utstanding"
Shs, Offered by Owners as a % o f Tot. Shs, Offered
CEO Equity Ownership (after IPO)
Change in CEO Equity Ownership Percentage
Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % (after IP O )d
Change in Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % d

*•
*♦
♦♦
♦♦
•*
♦*

7.78
-4.47
-7.94
-0.14
2.99
-5,58

34,254,817
1,43

♦*
♦♦

7.145,377
-0,66

96,966,094
69,370,027
187,236,375
23,315,680
7,998,503
68,937,825
1,638
3,315,272

*♦
♦*
♦♦
*♦
♦*
♦♦
*♦

11,476,465
19,489,459
-42,809,619
6,600,495
7,352,068
8,052.245
909
559,606

234,209
164,788

**
♦*

6,917,183
312,036
115.07

♦♦
*♦
♦♦

32.44
10,50
21.09
-9,27
25.80
-11.53

♦♦
-

-4,86
-7,39
-3.97
2.59
4.53
0,96

♦

♦ 0,003
*♦ 0,020
0.291
0,475
0.489
0,166

Proceeds
Estimated Proceeds from O ffering'
Net Proceeds / BV o f Assets Prior to IPO

-

+

-7,260,137
2,00

0.172
♦* 0.014

Size
Sales
Book Value o f Assets
MV o f Equity at Close o f 1st Day o f Trading *
Net Property, Plant & Equipment
Working Capital
Book Value o f Debt (excluding redeemable stock)
Number o f Employees
Shares Offered *

♦♦

-81,694,798
-42,518,001
57,339,444
-11,771,362
-1,536,395
-51,769,535
-1,346
-508,784

*

0,005
0.181

0.617
0,398
0.228
♦ 0,217
♦♦ 0,082
♦

0,098

Compensation
CEO Salary (prior FY)
CEO Bonus (prior FY)
CEO Stock Option Value (at IPO price)
CEO Salary per Employment Agreement
Salary Agreement as a % o f Prior Year Salary

2,492
-33,349
-6,032,921
-106,723
0,32

♦♦

-71,777
-129,906
-3,496,051
-116.074
45.77

** 0,008
♦♦ 0,076
** 0,012
•• 0,020
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(Table 7 continued)
V ariable

Intercept
(O ther M ature
Firms)

Pred.
Sign

Coefficient
(Roll-ups)

Pred.
Sign

Coefficient
(Start-ups)

Prob

<F)

Past Performance
Net Income
ROA (Nl / BV Assets Prior to IPO)

2,464.280
-0,003

-2.517,900
-0,03

-

-7,503,141
-0.44

♦♦ 0,035
*♦ 0,000

Growth
Growth Proxyb

8,07

♦♦

-4.52

+

10,38

♦* 0.000

0.22
19,44
9,44
24,81

♦♦
♦*
♦♦
♦♦

-0,02
-1,05
-5.38
9,23

+
+

0,02
1,92

0,195
♦♦ 0,005

-

-6.11

♦* 0,000

-

-4,80

0,097

Other Characteristics
Volatility o f Post-IPO Stock Returns •
Number o f Risk Factors in Prospectus
CEO Tenure in Years
Property, Plant & Equip as a % o f Total Assets

*
b
0
d
c
♦
**

-

♦♦

Assumes no exercise of the underwriters' over-allotment option and includesshares offered through private placements concurrent with IPO,
Defined as (market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets; bookvalue of debtincludes redeemable stock,
Regressions assume constant variance across subsamples,
Excludes CEO ownership.
Ranges from 9 to 30 months of stock returns for individual firms,
P-value<0,l0
P-value < 0.05,

4.2 Growth, Use o f Proceeds, and Risk
Table 8 presents the uses o f proceeds by IPO type.

The number o f uses

disclosed by individual firms ranges from one to seven. Six firms listed only one use
and eight listed as many as seven uses. Over 85% o f firms list working capital and
general corporate purposes as a planned use o f proceeds. H alf o f the start-up firms are
using the proceeds for R&D, whereas just 16% o f mature firms cite this use. None o f
the roll-ups disclose any R&D use. This lack o f R&D for roll-ups may be associated
with their IOS, plans for merging separate firms, and industry membership.
In contrast, 100% o f roll-ups are retiring debt. Only 74% and 42% o f other
mature firms and start-ups, respectively, plan to retire debt. The finding that all roll
ups are retiring debt offers insight into their organizational structure and debt
contracting. If the debt is at the "founding company" level, there may be constraints
on the organizational design o f the resulting firm (post-IPO). That is, they may not be
able to reconfigure into new profit and cost centers without paying o ff the debt. This
is related to potential conflicts among debt covenants that may place constraints on
investment opportunities. Another reason to pay off debt is to avoid wealth transfers
to debtholders, who may have claims against larger pools o f assets after the IPO.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the uses o f proceeds are categorized as follows: (I)
creating growth options, (2) exercising growth options, (3) retiring debt, and (4) other
uses. A growth proxy, market to book is regressed on the usage categories, risk
proxies, and dummy variables representing IPO types (start-ups and roll-ups). Results
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presented in Tables 9 and 10 indicate that these groupings have some predictive ability
for growth.
The exercising growth options (XGO) category in Table 9 is significantly
positive in all regressions (p-values range from 0.016 to 0.041), supporting the
prediction. Firms that are creating growth options (CGO) are also significant except
when IPO type dummies are included. The start-up dummy is evidently picking up the
differences in R&D uses. As expected, retiring debt is not significant in explaining
growth. The addition o f IPO type dummies in column 6 adds incremental explanatory
power. The start-up dummy is significantly positive in every regression in which it
appears, indicating that these firms exhibit greater growth options that mature IPOs.
The roll-up dummy is always negative and marginally significant with p-values
ranging from 0.082 to 0.106. This decrease in growth for roll-ups is partly caused by
the significantly larger book value o f assets found in these firms. The risk proxy,
volatility o f stock returns, is significantly positive, indicating that increases in
volatility are linked to higher growth and vice versa (also see Table 11).
A comparison o f results using two different risk proxies is presented in Table 10.
The proxies are (1) the SEC mandated risk factors (ex ante risk) and (2) volatility (ex
post risk). Columns 1, 2, and 4 o f Table 10 are the same as columns 1, 5, and 6 from
Table 9. Volatility (columns 2 and 4) is an ex p o st measure, so it includes more
information than the ex ante measure, number o f risk factors (columns 3 and 5). The
number o f risk factors is not significant in either regression, indicating that it has little
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Table 8: Frequencies o f Uses o f Proceeds by IPO Type
Start-ups
(36)
Use o f Proceeds*
Creatine Growth Options
Research and development

Mature Firms
(75)
Roll-up
Other
N=(57)
N=(18)

Total

(HI)

18
(50%)

0
(0%)

9
(16%)

27

35
(97%)

13
(72%)

47
(82%)

95

Capital expenditures

23
(64%)

7
(39%)

28
(49%)

58

Possible future acquisitions

16
(44%)

9
(50%)

29
(51%)

54

Sales and marketing

16
(44%)

0
(0%)

10
(18%)

26

2
(5%)

10
(56%)

7
(12%)

19

15
(42%)

18
(100%)

42
(74%)

75

1
(3%)

3
(17%)

10
(18%)

14

S-Corporation distributions
& founders' bonuses

I
(3%)

I
(5%)

8
(14%)

10

Security for letter o f credit
or lease

I
(3%)

I
(5%)

0
(0%)

2

Preferred dividends

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

I
(2%)

I

0
I
0
(0%)
(0%)
(5%)
l firm discloses th eir planned usage o f proceeds from the offering.
uses for individual firms ranges from 1 to 7.

1

Exercisine Growth Ontions
Working capital and general
corporate purposes

Current acquisitions & geographic
expansion
Retirine Debt
Retire debt
Redeem stock
Other Uses

Reorganization costs
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'he numb

Table 9: Relation o f Growth Proxy to Uses o f Proceeds, Risk, and IPO Type
Dummies
Dep. Variable = Growth = [<MV Equity + BV Debt) / BV Assets]
N=110 "
Intercept

Pred.
Sign

(1)

8.064
(0.000)

(2)

(3)

4.455
(0.025)

6.555
(0.017

6.736
(0.015)

1.567
(0.687)

-0.722
(0.852)

(5)

(4)

(6)

CGO

+

5.200
(0.013)

4.676
(0.024)

4.444
(0.032)

4.043
(0.045)

1304
(0395)

XGO

+

1.727
(0.016)

1.494
(0.036)

1.533
(0.033)

1.434
(0.041)

1.634
(0.020)

RETDEBT

0

-1.792
(0.265)

-1.785
(0.268)

-1.309
(0.417)

0.543
(0.741)

OTHER

0

-1.734
(0.543)

-1.650
(0.558)

-0.895
(0.741)

RISK(VOL)

+

23.112
(0.033)

21.915
(0.035)

DR

?

-4.515
(0.082)

-4.187
(0.106)

DS

+

7.126
(0.000)

5.785
(0.005)

0.117
0.189
Adj R1
0.099
0.148
0.102
0.096
ProbF
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.005
Prob (White
0.785
0.001
Statistic)
0.197
0.019
0.346
0.621
P-value of t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise.
a
One outlying observation is deleted.
CGO
Firms are creating growth options: includes uses of proceeds for R&D.
XGO
Firms are exercising growth options: includes uses of proceeds for
working capital and general corporate purposes, capital expenditures,
geographic expansion, current and future acquisitions, and sales and
marketing.
RETDEBT =
Firms are retiring debt including redeemable stock.
OTHER
Firms are using proceeds for S-corporation distributions, letters of credit,
reorganization costs, bonuses for founders, and preferred dividends.
RISK(VOL) =
Risk proxy: volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns.
The number of months range from 9 to 30.
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(Table 9 continued)
DR
=
Dummy for roll-ups is 1,0 otherwise.
DS
=
Dummy for start-up firms is I, 0 otherwise.
Note: For each firm, the disclosure o f a specific use of proceeds is coded I, and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, if an individual firm specified several uses included in the XGO grouping, the
XGO variable for that firm is the sum o f the coded ones (I).

57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 10: Relation o f Growth Proxy to Uses o f Proceeds, Risk, and IPO Type
Dummies: Comparison o f Two R isk Proxies
Dep. Variable = Growth = MV Equity + BV Debt) / BV Assets]
N=110 *

Pred.
Sign

Intercept

(1)

8.064
(0.000)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Risk=Vol.

Risk?=# o f
Risk Factors

Risk=Vol.

RiskF# o f Risk
Factors

1.567
(0.687)

7.192
(0.243)

-0.722
(0.852)

8.052
(0.176)

CGO

-f

4.043
(0.045)

4.458
(0.033)

1.304
(0.295)

1.648
(0.250)

XGO

-F

1.434
(0.041)

1.548
(0.036)

1.634
(0.020)

1.870
(0.012)

RETDEBT

0

-1.309
(0.417)

-1.808
(0.272)

0.543
(0.741)

0.001
(0.999)

OTHER

0

-1.650
(0.558)

-1.755
(0.541)

-0.895
(0.741)

-1.117
(0.685)

RISK

-F

23.112
(0.033)

-0.024
(0.533)

21.915
(0.035)

-0.208
(0.773)

DR

?

-4.515
(0.082)

-4.187
(0.106)

-4.545
(0.085)

DS

-F

7.126
(0.000)

5.785
(0.005)

6.073
(0.005)

0.117
0.167
0.148
0.189
Adj R2
0.088
0.003
0.000
ProbF
0.000
0.000
0.012
Prob (White
0.785
0.044
Statistic)
0.019
0.807
0.001
P-value of t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise.
a One outlying observation is deleted.
CGO
Firms are creating growth options: includes uses of proceeds for R&D.
XGO
Firms are exercising growth options: includes uses of proceeds for
working capital and general corporate purposes, capital expenditures,
geographic expansion, current and future acquisitions, and sales and
marketing.
RETDEBT =
Firms are retiring debt including redeemable stock.
Firms are using proceeds for S-corporation distributions, letters of credit,
OTHER
reorganization costs, bonuses for founders, and preferred dividends.
RISK
Columns 2 and 4: Volatility of post-IPO monthly stock returns; columns 3
and 5: Number of risk factors disclosed in prospectus.
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(Table 10 continued)
DS
=
Dummy for start-up firms is 1,0 otherwise.
DR
=
Dummy for roll-ups is 1,0 otherwise.
Note: For each firm, the disclosure o f a specific use of proceeds is coded 1, and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, if an individual firm specified several uses included in the XGO grouping, the
XGO variable for that firm is the sum o f the coded ones (1).
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explanatory power for growth.

As expected, volatility, which contains the most

information, does a much better job o f explaining the variation in growth.
4.2.1 R isk and Proceeds
Results from examining the relations among ex p ost risk, ex ante risk, and
growth are presented in Table 11. Volatility (ex p o st risk) is regressed on growth, the
uses o f proceeds categories, and the number o f risk factors.

Several issues are

examined: (I) the predictive power o f SEC’s required disclosure o f risk factors, (2)
the change in the predictive power o f these risk factors over time, and (3) the
predictive power o f growth and the uses o f proceeds categories.
The number o f risk factors (ex ante risk) is useful in predicting ex post risk.
This result holds both for Ritter’s (1991) older sample (column 1, Table 11) and for
this recent sample o f IPOs (column 2, Table 11). Over the years, the SEC’s policy has
changed about which risk factors to disclose, i.e., whether firms should include risk
factors that apply to all firms. The current sample includes many risk factors that
apply to all firms and this change has diminished the predictive power of this ex ante
risk measure (based on the decline in R2 in columns 1 and 2).

This result has

implications for policy-makers and investors.
Results shown in column 4 o f Table 11 indicate that the uses o f proceeds
categories are not significant in explaining volatility. The growth proxy, however,
does have predictive power. This result supports the efficient markets hypothesis, i.e.,
the market value o f the firm (numerator o f the proxy) reflects all available information
and the market to book measure is a useful predictor o f future stock return volatility.
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Table 11: Relation o f R isk to Growth and Proceeds
Dependent Variable = Volatility
Pred.
Sign

Ritter
Sample

(N=110)‘

(N=l,273)

(1)
Intercept

Current Sample

0.149
(0 .001)

(2)
0.048
(0.229)

GROWTH

(3)
0.053
(0.161)

(4)
0.075
(0.082)

0.002
(0.001)

0.002
(0.001)

CGO

0.012
(0.493)

XGO

-0.007
(0.280)

RETDEBT

-0.013
(0.260)

OTHER

0.010
(0.614)

RISK
FACTORS

0.005
(0 .001)

0.009
(0 .001 )

0.008
(0.001)

0.008
(0.001)

Adj R
0.249
0.146
0.244
0.235
ProbF
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Prob (White
Statistic)
0.001
0.020
0.030
0.771
P-value of t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise.
a
One outlying observation is deleted.
Volatility
Ex post risk proxy measured as the standard deviation o f monthly
stock returns. The number of months range from 9 to 30.
Ritter Sample
From Ritter’s (1991) IPO database of 1,526 firms for 1974-1983.
GROWTH
(MV Equity + BV Debt) / BV Assets.
CGO
Firms are creating growth options: includes uses of proceeds for
R&D.
XGO
Firms are exercising growth options: includes uses of proceeds for
working capital and general corporate purposes, capital expenditures,
geographic expansion, current and future acquisitions, and sales and
marketing.
RETDEBT
Firms are retiring debt including redeemable stock.
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(Table 11 continued)
OTHER

=

Firms are using proceeds for S-corporation distributions, letters of
credit, reorganization costs, bonuses for founders, and preferred
dividends.
RISK FACTORS = Number of risk factors disclosed in the prospectus.
Note: For each firm, the disclosure of a specific use of proceeds is coded 1, and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, if an individual firm specified several uses included in the XGO grouping, the
XGO variable for that firm is the sum o f the coded ones (1).
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4 3 Compensation
Details regarding the disclosures o f bonus plan information and methods o f
performance evaluation are presented in Table 12.

Only 16 firms disclose an

accounting metric used for cash bonuses. O f these sixteen firms, eleven (81.3%) are
classified as mature (two are roll-ups) and three (18.7%) are start-ups. This supports
the argument that accounting measures are more useful in mature firms than in start
ups and that IPOs are not homogeneous.
Eighty-three firms in Table 12 list the basis o f performance evaluation as either
(a) unspecified financial and other benchmarks, (b) unspecified performance
objectives, or (c) no disclosure. It is possible that these 83 firms use non-financial
performance measures.17 The evidence, though, shows that the explicit performance
evaluation criteria are accounting-based (one firm uses shareholder return).
Testable hypotheses related to CEO compensation are developed in Section 2.3,
summarized in Table I, and summary results reported in Table 19. In general, these
hypotheses test whether:

(1) compensation is related to growth and other IOS

measures, such as size, risk, and performance; (2) compensation is related to CEO
characteristics; and (3) compensation is related to IPO classifications.

The full

empirical model for testing compensation hypotheses is:

17 Studies examining the use o f non-financial performance incentives find that accounting data and stock
prices are not sufficient measures of CEO performance for some firms [Bushman et al. (1996)].
However, two-thirds o f the Bushman et al. (1996) sample firms report no weight on CEO non-financial
individual performance. Examples o f non-financial performance measures include market share,
efficiency or productivity, product quality, customer satisfaction, and employee satisfaction [Inner,
Larcker, and Rajan (1997)].
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COMPi = p0 + Pi SIZE + p2 GROWTH + p3 ROA + p4 RISK + p5CEOCOB
+ p6 CEOOWN + p7 DIROWN + pg TENURE + p9 FOUNDER + Pio DR
(4.3.1)

+ P ii DS + e
Where:
COMPi

Various measures o f CEO compensation (prior year
salary, salary per employment agreement, prior year bonus,
bonus as a proportion o f cash compensation, and value o f stock
options).

SIZE

Sales.

GROWTH

(Market value o f equity + Book value o f debt)/Book
value o f assets.

ROA

(Net income/Book value o f assets).

RISK

Volatility: Standard deviation o f post-IPO monthly
stock returns for 9 to 30 months.

CEOCOB

1 if CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.

CEOOWN

CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).

DIROWN

Equity ownership percentage (post-DPO) o f directors and
officers (excluding CEO).

TENURE

CEO tenure in years.

FOUNDER

1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.

DR

1 if firm is a roll-up, 0 otherwise.

DS

1 if firm is a start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Table 12: Distribution o f Cash Bonus Plan Disclosures
Frequency
Disclosures found in firms with cash bonus plans (100 firms):
Bonus based on a percentage of base salary
Bonus target disclosed
Maximum bonus disclosed
Minimum bonus disclosed
Method of performance evaluation:
Accounting
Pretax income
Operating profit
Earnings before taxes, depreciation, and amortization
Pretax income before extraordinary items
Gross margin
Non-Accounting
Shareholder Return
Unspecified
Unspecified financial and other benchmarks
Unspecified performance objectives
Not disclosed
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23
12
29
10

8
3
2
2
I

16
I

7
69
7

83
100

Results from the compensation regressions are presented in Tables 13 through
18 and summarized in Table 19. To avoid spurious proxy effects, the discussion o f
results emphasizes regressions that include all variables.
Size is significantly positive in both salary regressions (Tables 13 and 14), which
supports previous findings that CEOs o f larger firms have higher compensation. The
reasoning is that larger firms are more complex and more difficult to manage.
The lack o f a relation between growth and salaries (Tables 13 and 14) is the
opposite o f findings by Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Baber et al. (1996). The growth
measure used in Baber et al. (1996) is positive and significant only for salaries,
indicating that executives in firms with high levels o f investment opportunities receive
higher salaries. Gaver and Gaver (1993) find that executives in growth firms are paid
more total compensation.18 These conflicting results may partly be due to the different
growth proxies used in these studies. Both o f these studies use factor analysis to
distinguish higher growth firms from lower growth firms. The use o f these factors
results in the Gavers’ growth firms being large, profitable companies that dominate
their product markets. Their description o f growth firms is the opposite o f the growth
IPOs in this study.
Firm performance is theoretically linked to incentive compensation, but not to
fixed compensation (salary). The prediction that ROA has no effect on salary levels is
supported by the data (Tables 13 and 14). Other studies have found mixed results for

18 Gaver and Gaver’s (1993) measure o f total compensation is the average cash compensation (salary
and bonus) received by the top five executives.
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risk proxies included in compensation regressions. The prediction made is that CEO
salary is higher for riskier firms due to risk aversion and thus, demands for a risk
premium.

This salary prediction is supported for prior year salary presented in

columns 3 and 4 o f Table 13.

Note that both o f these models include CEO

characteristics. The models in columns 3 and 4, which include CEO characteristics,
may be better specified, thus the positive, significant coefficient on risk. In contrast,
risk does not have any explanatory power for any o f the regressions in Table 14 (base
salary per employment agreement).
Results from the inclusion o f certain CEO characteristics and ownership
variables are mixed. For this sample, the fact that the CEO is also the Chairman o f the
Board does not make any difference in compensation levels (Tables 13 and 14). This
result is opposite to the findings in Cyert et al. (1997) and Core et al. (1999).
As predicted, CEOs receive more salary as their ownership increases (Tables 13
and 14). This result supports the assertion that CEOs receive risk premiums in the
form o f salary when their equity ownership placed large amounts o f firm risk on them.
Ownership by officers and directors, other than the CEO, is expected to give
board members an incentive to monitor directly. Therefore, it is possible that CEO
incentives such as bonuses and stock options are not as necessary for evaluation
purposes.

As expected, results indicate that director and officer ownership is

insignificant for CEO salary (Tables 13 and 14).
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The argument that salary Is increasing in CEO tenure is supported in Tables 13
and 14. Increased salary may be a reward for staying with the firm and acquiring the
human capital necessary.
Whether the CEO is a founder appears to make a difference in salary levels and
its effect is negative. Coefficients on these variables indicate that founders receive
$63,000-65,000 less than non-founders (Table 13).

For employment agreement

salaries (Table 14), salaries are about $59,000 lower for founders. These results are
inconsistent with CEO opportunism. That is, the results are inconsistent with CEOs
using their “power” to extract “excessive” compensation from the firm.
The type o f IPO only seems to make a difference in one o f the salary regressions.
This is a regression o f salary per employment agreement and involves roll-ups
(column 2, Table 14). This forward-looking salary amount is significantly negative for
roll-ups, indicating that these types o f IPOs contract for lower base salaries than other
mature firms. It may be possible that the incentive component for roll-ups is greater
and a trade-off between fixed and incentive compensation is being made.

This

possibility cannot be determined based on the data available.
As found in the salary regressions, CEOs o f larger firms receive higher bonuses
and growth has no explanatory value (Tables 15 and 17). The association between
incentive compensation and firm performance has been well documented.

Cash

bonuses for large firm samples are tied to firm performance, which is usually
measured by an accounting metric.

In Table 15, ROA is significantly positive

(p=0.075) in only one bonus regression (column 1). This result may be due to the
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Table 13: Regression Results for CEO Salary
Pred
Sign

Salary
(1)
93
159,333
(0.001)

Dependent Variable
Salary
Salary
(2)
(3)
82
93
166,439
107,656
(0.001)
(0.006)

Salary
(4)
82
98,921
(0.016)

SIZE

-f-

0.0006
(0.001)

0.0005
(0.001)

0.0005
(0.001)

0.0005
(0.001)

GROWTH

0

-498
(0.544)

-157
(0.854)

-404
(0.617)

-271
(0.750)

ROA

0

10,244
(0.602)

2,142
(0.919)

26,838
(0.184)

31,965
(0.149)

RISK

+

76,988
(0.263)

59,604
(0.315)

219,479
(0.034)

237,466
(0.027)

CEOCOB

+

-2,428
(0.550)

-1,662
(0.534)

CEOOWN

+

1,078
(0.025)

948
(0.047)

DIROWN

0

298
(0.622)

233
(0.703)

TENURE

+

3,442
(0.008)

3,825
(0.008)

FOUNDER

?

-63,419
(0.003)

-65,065
(0.003)

DR

+

15,863
(0.302)

30,829
(0.134)

DS

0

-23,380
(0.260)

9,188
(0.669)

N*
Intercept

Adj R2
Prob F

0.331
0.001

0330
0.001

0.420
0.001

0.414
0.001

0.640
0.786
0.691
Prob(White Statistic)
0.725
P-value o f t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise.
a
Two outlying observations are deleted.
Salary
=
Prior year cash salary.
SIZE
=
Sales.
GROWTH =
(Market value o f equity + book value of debt)/book value o f assets.
ROA
Net income/book value o f assets.
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(Table 13 continued)
RISK
CEOCOB
CEOOWN
DIROWN
TENURE
FOUNDER
DR
DS

=
=
=

Standard deviation o f post-IPO monthly stock returns. These range from 9 to 30
months for individual firms.
1 if CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding
CEO).
CEO tenure in years.
1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
1 if roll-up, 0 otherwise.
I if start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Table 14: Regression Results for CEO Salary per Employment Agreement
Dependent Variable
Salagree
Salagree
(2)
(3)
67
78
235,589
165,402
(0.001)
(0.001)

Pred
Sign

Salagree
(1)
78
204,205
(0.001)

SIZE

+

0.0004
(0.001)

0.0004
(0.001)

0.0003
(0.010)

0.0003
(0.006)

GROWTH

0

-777
(0.299)

-769
(0302)

-849
(0.664)

-2,196
(0301)

ROA

0

6.264
(0.779)

-6,274
(0.793)

-5,621
(0.807)

-304
(0.991)

RISK

+

42,168
(0390)

22,685
(0.439)

100,309
(0251)

120,457
(0214)

CEOCOB

+

-4,983
(0.578)

-11,488
(0.673)

CEOOWN

+

977
(0.082)

1,175
(0.050)

DIROWN

0

-26
(0.968)

71
(0.914)

TENURE

+

6,094
(0.001)

5,047
(0.014)

FOUNDER

9

-59,104
(0.030)

-59300
(0.030)

DR

+

-80,520
(0.002)

-41,568
(0.081)

DS

0

-42,111
(0.125)

7,565
(0.799)

N*
Intercept

Adj R2
ProbF

0.132
0.006

0316
0.001

0248
0.002

Salagree
(4)
67
182,933
(0.001)

0257
0.003

0.569
0.697
0.716
Prob(White Statistic)
0.526
P-value o f t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-taiied and two-tailed otherwise.
"
Two outlying observations are deleted.
Salagree
=
CEO base salary per employment agreement.
SIZE
=
Sales.
GROWTH =
(Market value o f equity + book value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
ROA
=
Net income/book value o f assets.
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(Table 14 continued)
RISK
CEOCOB
CEOOWN
DIROWN
TENURE
FOUNDER
DR
DS

=

=

Standard deviation o f post-IPO monthly stock returns. These range from 9 to 30
months for individual firms.
1 if CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding
CEO).
CEO tenure in years.
1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
1 if roll-up, 0 otherwise.
1 if start-up, 0 otherwise.
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unique characteristics o f IPOs and the fact that many o f these firms are experiencing
poor accounting performance, but still pay out bonuses. Another explanation is related
to the model specifications in the table. The model in column 1 does not include any
CEO characteristics variables or the classification dummies (intercept dummies). The
addition o f the classification dummies, DR and DS, in column 2 reduces the
coefficient and significance o f ROA, and the dummies are significantly negative. In
the bonus proportion regressions o f Table 17, ROA is only significant in one
regression (column 4) and it is negative (p-value = 0.079). This result must be due to
differences in model specifications.
It is asserted that firm performance may be more closely related to incentive
compensation for large firms with considerable assets-in-place.

To test this, the

sample is sorted by size (sales) and separated into thirds. Interaction terms (slope
dummies) are created for the smallest third (ROA*SMALL) and the largest third
(ROA*LARGE). Tables 15 and 17 include results from using the interaction o f these
dummies with ROA. Columns 5 and 6 in both tables indicate that ROA is more useful
and has a stronger and positive relation with bonuses for the largest firms.

The

relation with ROA for the smallest firms does not appear to be significantly different
from the relation found in medium-sized firms (ROA without any interaction). This
result confirms that accounting numbers are more useful as a performance evaluation
tool in larger firms. Pne significant coefficient for ROA*LARGE in columns 5 and 6
also reveals that even if these firms do not specify the performance evaluation criteria
they use, i.e., whether it is accounting based or not, there are ties between bonuses and
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accounting return.

An unexpected significant coefficient for the dummy,

ROA*SMALL in column 4 o f Table 17, may be related to model specification for
bonus proportions, since the significance declines when the model includes CEO
characteristic variables.
The only CEO characteristic or ownership variable that is consistently
significant for both bonuses and bonus proportion regressions is the equity ownership
o f officers and directors (Tables 15 and 17). Ownership by officers and directors,
other than the CEO, is expected to give board members an incentive to monitor
directly. Therefore, it is possible that CEO incentives such as bonuses and stock
options are not as necessary for evaluation purposes so ownership doesn’t matter. The
results, though, indicate that director and officer ownership does have explanatory
power for CEO bonuses.

The coefficient is positive, indicating that bonuses are

increasing in the ownership by officers and directors. This indicates that as this type
o f ownership increases, there is a shift towards performance-related compensation.
One exception to the lack o f significance for CEO characteristics other than
directors’ ownership is found in one o f the bonus regressions (column 6, Table 15).
CEOCOB is significantly positive (p-value = 0.080), but only when the model includes
the interactions between ROA and size.

There doesn’t appear to be an intuitive

explanation for this result.
In contrast to the salary results, IPO types are significant in explaining the
variation in CEO bonuses.

Both the roll-up and start-up intercept dummies are

negative, indicating that cash incentive compensation (bonuses) for these types o f
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firms is significantly lower than that o f other mature firms. It may be that these firms
substitute stock-based incentives for cash incentives.
The components o f cash compensation (salary plus bonus) are combined for
regressions presented in Table 16.

This analysis is presented because this is the

definition o f compensation used in other studies. The results document the confusing
results that this combination causes. The underlying theory o f fixed compensation
versus cash incentive compensation (bonuses) differs, making it difficult to predict the
directional effect o f explanatory variables. The direction depends on the strength o f
the two components. Therefore, examination of the results in Table 16 do not support
all the predictions for salary (Tables 13 and 14) or bonus (Tables 15 and 17).
As predicted, size is not significant for stock option values (Table 18). Stockbased incentives are used as substitutes for eamings-based incentives in firms with low
or negative earnings. Growth options, not size, drive this substitution.

Thus, the

growth proxy, market to book, is significantly positive in the stock option value
regressions (Table 18), but not in the salary or bonus compensation regressions. This
result supports the prediction that stock-based compensation is greater in firms with
larger proportions o f growth options. The reasoning is that it is harder to monitor
managers o f high growth firms, partly because accounting performance measures are
less useful. If these firms have high initial operating costs, or if they are investing in
R&D and/or advertising, then the requirement that these types o f expenditures be
expensed causes net income to be low or negative. One way to provide an ex ante
incentive for CEOs to maximize firm value is to grant stock options. As the value o f
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Table 15: Regression Results for CEO Cash Bonus Compensation
Pred
Sign

N*
Intercept

Dependent Variable
Bonus
Bonus
Bonus

Bonus

Bonus

CD

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

92
40,831
(0328)

92
76,078
(0.084)

81
-47,910
(0.487)

(6)

81
-699
(0.992)

92
87399
(0.043)

92
12,370
(0.860)

Bonus

SIZE

+

0.0004
(0.002)

0.0004
(0.004)

0.0005
(0.001)

0.0005
(0.001)

0.0004
(0.002)

0.0004
(0.003)

GROWTH

0

973
(0.434)

1,215
(0.339)

798
(0.580)

761
(0.598)

1,294
(0300)

971
(0.496)

ROA*SMALL

0

39374
(0.496)

14,768
(0.813)

ROA

0

-24,023
(0.627)

-22,320
(0.674)

ROA* LARGE

+

285,170
(0.004)

400,591
(0.025)

RISK

0

-95,252
(0.593)

-151314
(0.456)

CEOCOB

52,653
(0.075)

-2,578
(0.945)

-137,059
(0.505)

+

29,175
(0 3 1 1)

30,707
(0.189)

50,780
(0.080)

CEOOWN

0

544
(0.576)

958
(0.313)

172
(0.866)

DIROWN

0

2,450
(0.026)

2,707
(0.012)

2,016
(0.068)

TENURE

0

1.4
(0.999)

-2,199
(0.419)

-2,615
(0.333)

FOUNDER

?

10,421
(0.774)

22,810
(0.523)

23,860
(0.504)

DR

0

-93,359
(0.054)

-117,407
(0.021)

-97,137
(0.041)

-98,618
(0.055)

DS

-

-52,917
(0.044)
0.140
0.004

-73,437
(0.025)
0.174
0.010

-52,396
(0.041)
0.191
0.001

-63,494
(0.045)
0.198
0.007

0.103
0.009

-3,431
(0.985)

32,401
(0365)

-33,600
(0.872)

Adj R2
ProbF

56,379
(0.756)

31,196
(0.313)

0.104
0.048

0.890
0.987
0.578
0.307
0.371
0.969
Prob (White Statistic)
P-value o f t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise.
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(Table 15 continued)
a
Three outlying observations are deleted.
Prior year cash bonus.
Bonus
=
SIZE
Sales.
GROWTH =
(Market value o f equity + book value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
ROA*SMALL=
Interaction term; SMALL is I if the size (sales) o f the firm is in the smallest third
o f the distribution, 0 otherwise.
ROA
Net income/book value o f assets.
Interaction term; LARGE is 1 if the size (sales) o f the firm is in the largest third o f
ROA*LARGE=
the distribution, 0 otherwise.
Standard deviation o f post-IPO monthly stock returns. These range from 9 to 30
RISK
months for individual firms.
CEOCOB
I if CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEOOWN =
CEO e q u ity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding
DIROWN
CEO).
TENURE
CEO tenure in years.
FOUNDER =
I if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
DR
I if roll-up, 0 otherwise.
DS
I if start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Table 16: Regression Results for CEO Cash Com pensation
Pred
Sign
N*
Intercept

Dependent Variable
Cashcomp
Cashcomp
(2)
(1)
92
81
91,346
194,145
(0.001)
(0.303)

SIZE

+

0.0009
(0.001)

0.0010
(0.001)

GROWTH

0

294
(0.855)

130
(0.943)

ROA

0

71,845
(0.060)

36,443
(0.441)

RISK

+/0

188,677
(0.422)

146,375
(0.573)

CEOCOB

+

26,916
(0.271)

CEOOWN

+/0

2,289
(0.059)

DIROWN

0

3,078
(0.023)

TENURE

+/0

1,225
(0.722)

?

-48,024
(0.289)

DR

+/0

-80,990
(0.201)

DS

0/-

-65,159
(0.167)

FOUNDER

Adj R2
ProbF

0.295
0.001

0.337
0.001

0.743
Prob (White Statistic)
0.187
P-value o f t-statistics are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed except for one-tailed tests on SIZE and
CEOCOB.
a
Three outlying observations are deleted.
Cashcomp
=
Prior year salary plus prior year cash bonus.
SIZE
=
Sales.
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(Table 16 continued)
GROWTH
ROA
RISK
CEOCOB
CEOOWN
DIROWN
TENURE
FOUNDER
DR
DS

=

=
=

=

(Market value o f equity +■book value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
Net income/book value o f assets.
Standard deviation o f monthly stock returns. These range from 9 to 30 months for
individual firms.
1 if CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding
CEO).
CEO tenure in years.
1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
I if roll-up, 0 otherwise.
I o f start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Table 17: Regression Results for CEO Bonus as a Proportion o f Total Cash
_________________________ Compensation_________________________
Pred
Sign
N*
Intercept
SIZE
GROWTH

+

0

ROA*SMALL

0

ROA

0

ROA*LARGE

-t-

RISK

0

CEOCOB

+

CEOOWN

0

Bonus
Prop
(t)
90
0.194
(0.002)

Dependent Variable
Bonus
Bonus
Bonus
Prop
Prop
Prop
(2)
C3)
(4)
90
79
90
0.247
0.145
0265
(0.001)
(0.138)
(0.001)

Bonus
Prop
(5)
79
0.176
(0.066)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.043)

(0.075)

(0.016)

(0.041)

(0.055)

0.001
(0.735)

0.001

0.001

0.001

(0.559)

(0.487)

(0.437)

0.002
(0.394)

0.147
(0.068)

0.124
(0.144)

-0.122
(0.079)

-0.096
(0.181)

0.531
(0.001)

0.680
(0.008)

-0.358
(0.152)

-0256
(0200)

0.054
(0.202)

-0.118
(0.654)

0.024
(0.593)

-0.209
(0.425)

-0.004
(0.933)

0.339
(0239)
0.025
(0.307)

0.058
(0.126)

0.001

(0.571)

-0.001
(0.779)

DIROWN

0

0.003
(0.020)

0.002
(0.150)

TENURE

0

0.001
(0.956)

-0.001
(0.840)

FOUNDER

?

-0.001
(0.979)

-0.011
(0.825)

DR

0

-0.147
(0.035)

-0.169
(0.016)

-0.161
(0.015)

-0.152
(0.023)

DS

-

-0.010
(0.033)
0.137
0.030

-0.072
(0.045)
0.189
0.001

-0.073
(0.079)
0.199
0.008

0.679

0.689

0.511

Adj R2
ProbF

0.028
0.170

-0.078
(0.043)
0.076
0.049

Prob(White Statistic)

0.089

0.243
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(Table 17 continued)
P-value o f t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise.
1
Five outlying observations are deleted.
Bonus Prop =
Prior year cash bonus / (prior year cash salary +- bonus).
SIZE
Sales.
GROWTH =
(Market value o f equity +- book value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
ROA*SMALL=
Interaction term; SMALL is I if the size (sales) o f the firm is in the smallest third
o f the distribution, 0 otherwise.
ROA
Net income/book value o f assets.
ROA*LARGE=
Interaction term; LARGE is 1 if the size (sales) o f the firm is in the largest third o f
the distribution, 0 otherwise.
RISK
Standard deviation o f monthly stock returns.
CEOCOB
1 if CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEOOWN =
CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
DIROWN
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding
CEO).
TENURE
CEO tenure in years.
FOUNDER =
1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
DR
I if roll-up, 0 otherwise.
DS
I if start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Table 18: Regression Results for CEO Stock O ption Values
Dependent Variable
SO Value SO Value SO Value
(2)
(3)
(4)
56
62
56
-950,577
2,219,456
-659,764
(0.614)
(0.145)
(0.714)

Pred
Sign

SO Value
(1)
62
2,937,814
(0.045)

SIZE

0

-0.0009
(0.857)

0.0020
(0.702)

0.0020
(0.678)

0.0038
(0.431)

0.0044
(0255)

GROWTH

-t-

43,130
(0.058)

25,732
(0-185)

227,186
(0.001)

191233
(0.001)

192,792
(0.001)

ROA.

+

-44,749
(0.519)

645,973
(0263)

1,132,189
(0.108)

1,854,803
(0.034)

-758,476
(0.668)

RISK

0

-4,230,478
(0.512)

2,017,845
(0.756)

-117,797
(0.985)

2,421,561
(0.701)

-2,885,426
(0.672)

CEOCOB

0

1,178,989
(0254)

967,196
(0.348)

397,037
(0.705)

CEOOWN

-

34270
(0.820)

35,633
(0.823)

42,881
(0.871)

DIROWN

-

37,356
(0.928)

37,694
(0.933)

29,419
(0.882)

TENURE

0

-70,375
(0.389)

-63,994
(0.475)

-73,410
(0.402)

FOUNDER

?

-1274,312
(0269)

-1,524,956
(0.184)

-1,345,440
(0230)

DR

0

-1,174,114
(0.381)

-1271,547
(0.326)

-1,594,944
(0213)

DS

+

1,516,938
(0.082)

1,325,310
(0.114)

2,060,639
(0.038)

ROA*DS

?

N*
Intercept

SO Value
(5)
56
569243
(0.778)

3,522,914
(0.076)

Adj R2
ProbF

-0.020
0.597

0.033
0.414

0210
0.001

0231
0.002

0.365
0.001

Prob(White Statistic)

0.835

0.584

0.941

0.616

0.900

P-value of t statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise.
a Three outlying observations are deleted.
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(Table 18 continued)
SO Value
SIZE
GROWTH
ROA
RISK
CEOCOB
CEOOWN
DIROWN
TENURE
FOUNDER
DR
DS
ROA*DS

Sum o f in-the-money value o f exercisable stock options (at IPO price) and the
Black-Scholes (1973) value o f unexercisable stock options (modified for early
exercise).
Sales.
(Market value o f equity + book value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
N et income/book value o f assets.
Standard deviation o f post-IPO monthly stock returns. These returns range from 9
to 30 months for individual firms.
I if CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding
CEO).
CEO tenure in years.
1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
1 if roll-up, 0 otherwise.
I if start-up, 0 otherwise.
Interaction term.
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the firm increases, the CEO receives an ex post reward as the cash value o f their
options and the underlying stock increases. They can then increase their wealth by
cashing out when the options are in the money.
The firm performance variable, ROA, is not significantly different from zero
except in column 4 o f Table 18.

This particular regression includes all CEO

characteristic and ownership variables and the IPO type dummies. A firm’s stock
value is expected to be higher if that firm has performed well in the past. To test
whether there is a relation between ROA and the IPO type dummies, an interaction
term (slope dummy), ROA*DS, is included in the regression in column 5 o f Table 18.
ROA becomes insignificant, but the interaction term is significant with a large positive
coefficient. The start-up dummy becomes more significant also. This is counter to
intuition about start-ups and the usefulness o f performance measured with accounting
numbers (p-value decreases from 0.114 to 0.038). It is possible that the value o f stock
options performs differently from the change in the value o f stock options as a
measure o f stock-based compensation for a given year.
CEO ownership is predicted to be negatively related to stock option values. This
prediction is based on the premise that the more equity ownership the CEO has, the
more he or she is aligned with the incentives o f stockholders and less stock-based
incentive compensation is needed. Results indicate that the equity ownership o f the
CEO has no effect on stock option values.

The equity ownership o f officers and

directors doesn’t have an effect on stock option values either. As predicted, risk,
whether the CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, and the CEO’s tenure has no effect in
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the stock option value regressions. Whether the CEO is a founder makes no difference
either.
In summary, the classification o f IPOs into three types (other mature firms, roll
ups, and start-ups) has explanatory value in the compensation tests. Classification as a
roll-up has a negative effect on salary per the employment agreement and bonus levels
and proportions. As found with roll-ups, CEOs o f start-ups also have lower cash
bonuses (levels and proportions). Startups do not differ from mature firms for salary
levels, but stock option values are significantly greater than those found other types o f
IPOs. These high growth firms are using more stock option incentives and less bonus
incentives.
Overall, the results (see summary Table 19) indicate that CEO base salaries are
increasing in the size o f the firm, CEO equity ownership, and CEO tenure, but
decreasing when the CEO is also a founder. Salaries for roll-ups and start-ups are not
significantly different from those o f other mature firms. Cash incentive compensation
(bonuses) is found to be increasing in size and officers’ and directors’ equity
ownership but decreasing for roll-ups and start-ups. In addition, ROA for the largest
one-third o f sample firms is positively associated with cash bonuses. As expected,
stock option values are increasing in growth opportunities, especially for start-up
firms. Broadly, the results are consistent with efficient contracting and inconsistent
with CEO opportunism.
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Table 19: Summary of Compensation Results
Independent Variables
Sa ary
Pred. Sien Sien Found
IOS
Size (Sales)
Growth
Firm performance (ROA)
Risk (Volatility)
CEO Characteristics & Ownership
CEO is chairman of the board
CEO ownership
Directors’ & officers’ ownership
CEO tenure
CEO is a founder

+
0
0
+

+
0
0
+

+

0
+
0
+

0
+
?

-

Dependent Variables
Bonus
Pred. Sien Sien Found
|
I ' +
I
0
|
0/+
1
0
1
1
+
0
0
0
?

Stock Options
Pred. Sien Sien Found

+
0
0/+
0

0
+
+
0

0
+
0/+
0

+
0
+
0
0

0

0
0
0
0
0

-

0
?

IPO Type
+
0
0
Roll-up
0
II
0
+
+
0
Start-up
o
1
8 Sign found is for the full model without interaction terms. For salary, this is column 4 of Table 13; for bonus, column 6 of Table IS; and
for stock option values, column 4 of Table 18.
Pred. sign = “0” indicates that the estimate is not expected to be statistically different from zero.
Pred. sign = “ ?” indicates that no prediction is m ade about the direction o f the effect.

4.4 Sensitivity Analyses
This section discusses the procedures used to identify outliers in the data and
alternative measures and specifications. First, regressions are run with all observations
included. Studentized residuals are examined to identify possible outliers. For each
dependent variable, dummy variables are formed for each observation that has a
studentized residual greater than or equal to two. This technique allows the detection
o f outliers using variable selection techniques [Peixoto and LaMotte (1989)]. Based
on the results o f an R2 variable selection procedure, one to five observations are
deleted for each dependent variable prior to performing any o f the reported
compensation tests. A comparison o f the reported results with those that include the
influential observations indicate that some signs change, significant coefficients
become insignificant and vice versa, and the magnitude of coefficients differ.
4.4.1 Growth Proxies and Industry Effects
Several alternative growth proxies are tested in the growth and use o f proceeds
regressions. The proxies are: (1) same growth proxy used in the study except that
redeemable stock is excluded from the numerator, (2) same growth proxy used in the
study except that only long-term liabilities are added to market value o f equity in the
numerator, (3) same as (2) above, except that redeemable stock is excluded from long
term liabilities, (4) proceeds / book value o f assets, and (5) (book value o f equity +
proceeds) / book value o f assets. Results from these regressions are not qualitatively
different from the market to book measure reported in the tables.
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Ely (1991) finds that firms in the same industry face similar production
environments and therefore have similar IOS. Industry membership for each firm is
tabulated, resulting in eleven industry dummy variables. These dummies are included
in the growth regressions to test whether any additional IOS characteristics are picked
up by industry membership. Results o f F tests from these regressions indicate that
industry dummies are not jointly significantly different from zero (p-value=0.427),
whereas the theory variables, CGO, XGO, RETDEBT, and OTHER, have a joint
significance level o f p=0.023.

Therefore, the variables are not ju st picking up

“industry” effects.
Interactions between the theory variables, CGO, XGO, RETDEBT, and OTHER,
and the roll-up and start-up dummies are also tested. None o f the interaction terms are
individually significant and the explanatory power o f the model doesn’t differ
qualitatively from the results reported.
Since the total number o f uses o f proceeds has been used as a proxy o f ex ante
uncertainty, this variable is substituted for risk factors in the growth regressions to see
how its explanatory power compares with volatility.

The coefficient is not

significantly different from zero.
4.4.2 Compensation, Industry Effects, and Performance Evaluation
For compensation regressions, sensitivity tests on two alternate size proxies,
book value of assets and log o f sales, are performed. Using book value o f assets or log
o f sales instead o f sales as the size proxy does not change the results qualitatively.
When log of sales is used, the model explains less o f the variation in salary than does
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the use o f sales (R2 decreases by .15), but the log does a better job explaining variation
in the stock option value model (R2 increases by .33). The use o f log o f sales in the
tests causes the condition numbers in each regression to be about 28, indicating some
degree o f collinearity with the intercept.
Compensation hypotheses are also tested with industry membership included.
Ely (1991) finds that firms in the same industry face similar production environments
and therefore have similar IOS. Thus, including industry dummies in the tests controls
for differences in the demand for managerial talent [Cyert, et al. (1997)]. Two-digit
SIC codes are used to proxy for industry membership.
Ten industry dummies are included in the models to see if industry membership
has any explanatory power, which would imply that the models are misspecified if
•y

they are not included. Adjusted R decreases when the industry dummies are included,
and an F test on the dummies indicates than they are not jointly significantly different
from zero.
Some firms did not pay cash bonuses. The bonus variable for these firms is
coded zero because that is the true value. This differs from observations that have
missing values. To test whether firms with zero bonuses affect the inferences, these
zero bonus firms are excluded. The bonus regressions are rerun and compared with
regressions that include the firms with zero bonuses. Results indicate that bonus levels
are not sensitive to excluding zero values.
Tests are run to see if growth and IPO types have any explanatory power for the
types o f performance evaluation used for cash bonuses. First, performance criteria is
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split between firms that disclose the use o f an accounting metric and those that did not.
Second, performance criteria is separated into three categories, (I) firms that disclose
accounting performance usage, (2) those that specify financial and other benchmarks,
and (3) firms that disclose only unspecified performance objectives. None o f the
variables in these regressions are significantly different from zero, individually or as a
group.
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5. SUMMARY, BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF SAMPLE, AND FUTURE
RESEARCH
This study examines the components o f CEO compensation for IPOs. Testing
salary, bonus, and stock options separately provides more powerful tests than studies
that combine these components. This is because the theory underlying the various
components varies depending on whether the component is fixed, a short-term cash
incentive or a long-term stock incentive. Unlike previous studies, this study does not
assume that IPOs are homogeneous, but that IPOs, and hence their contracts, vary with
firm characteristics.

Results from a sample o f 111 IPOs support this prediction.

Further, this study documents the nature o f an interesting subset o f IPOs: roll-ups.
Descriptive statistics indicate that roll-ups differ from other IPOs in several ways.
These differences provide insight into their IOS and contracting constraints.
First, this study finds that there are considerable cross-sectional differences
among firm characteristics o f IPOs. Second, the equity ownership retained by CEOs
and other officers and directors is much higher than found in large firm samples,
which means that IPOs have a substitute monitoring mechanism. The high ownership
provides an incentive for board members to collect the data necessary for more direct
monitoring. Third, IPOs have substantial growth opportunities. Median market to
book for IPOs in this sample is over five times the book value o f assets. In contrast,
median growth opportunities for 450 large firms (Forbes) in Bizjak et al. (1993) is
0.67 o f book value. The large difference between the two studies may be partly due to
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book value for IPOs being a poor proxy for the present value o f future cash flows from
assets in place.
This paper argues that accounting numbers are less useful as monitoring or
incentive devices for IPOs. This argument is supported by: (I) the fact that start-ups
have low or negative earnings, yet CEOs still receive bonuses, (2) the lack o f explicit
wording in employment contracts regarding how bonuses are derived, and (3) the
evidence that firm performance (ROA) is positively linked for only the largest firms.
It appears that boards o f directors take into account the low or negative earnings o f
many IPOs and they retain discretion in making bonus awards. Additionally, the large
equity ownership o f CEOs and other officers and directors indicates that incentives to
maximize value exist, so more direct monitoring mechanisms are unnecessary.
Further, this study documents departures from findings in large firm
compensation studies. This study finds that higher growth firms do not pay higher
salaries and bonuses or that CEOs who are also Chairman o f the Board receive higher
compensation.

Overall, the results are consistent with efficient contracting and

inconsistent with CEO opportunism.
5.1 Benefits and Limitations o f Sample
There are several limitations and benefits associated with this study. First, using
a sample o f IPO firms imposes a small firm bias and decreases the generalizability o f
the results. This problem with generalization o f inferences also applies to IPOs in
other time periods due to the documented "hot and cold" IPO markets. On the other
hand, the benefit o f using an IPO sample is that we leam something about

92

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

compensation contracting for a sample o f firms largely ignored in the literature. Large
firm samples may represent most o f the market capitalization, but they do not
represent the majority o f compensation contracts for publicly-traded firms.
Second, using proxies to measure theoretical constructs introduces measurement
error. This is especially true for growth opportunities and business risk. Using a
sample o f younger firms, though, may lessen the measurement error in the growth
proxy. In addition, disclosure o f the planned uses o f proceeds from the IPO offers a
unique opportunity to incorporate additional growth information. Also, few samples
provide both an ex ante and ex post measure o f risk, as documented here.
Third, executive compensation, growth opportunities, risk, firm performance,
corporate governance, and size are endogenous. Modeling any o f these variables is
problematic since they are internal to the firm and underlying exogenous factors are
difficult to identify.
5.2 Future Research
Examination o f contracts for smaller and younger firms offers an opportunity to
document the development o f these firms. Future research can analyze the changes in
IOS and its relation to compensation contracts as these firms grow and as the time
subsequent to the IPO lengthens. Following a set o f IPOs over time allows (1) a
longer series o f stock returns for computing volatility, (2) documentation o f the
manner in which the firm grows, (3) examination o f accounting performance measures
disclosed for changing contracts, and (4) computation o f changes in compensation
levels from year to year.
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Another task in compensation research is to find better ways o f modeling the
endogeneity o f compensation, IOS, CEO characteristics, and corporate governance
proxies. A simultaneous system o f equations underlies the structure and is needed to
properly test these relations.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable Name
BONUS
BONUS PROP
CASHCOMP
CEOCOB
CEOOWN
CGO
DIROWN
DR
DS
FOUNDER
GROWTH
OTHER
RETDEBT
RISK FACTORS
RISK (VOL)
ROA
ROA*DS
ROA*SMALL
ROA*LARGE
SALARY
SALAGREE
SIZE
SO VALUE
TENURE
VOLATILITY
XGO

Definition
Prior year cash bonus.
Prior year cash bonus as a proportion of prior year cash compensation
(salary plus bonus).
Prior year cash salary plus prior year cash bonus.
1 if CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Firms are creating growth options: includes uses o f proceeds for R&D.
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) of directors and officers
(excluding CEO).
Intercept dummy for roll-ups is 1,0 otherwise.
Intercept dummy for start-ups is 1,0 otherwise.
1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
(Market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets.
Firms are using proceeds for S-corporation distributions, letters of credit,
reorganization costs, bonuses for founders, and preferred dividends.
Firms are retiring debt including redeemable stock.
Number of risk factors disclosed in prospectus.
Volatility: standard deviation of post-IPO monthly stock returns.
Net income/book value of assets.
Interaction term with ROA and start-up dummy.
Interaction term; SMALL is 1 if the size (sales) o f the firm is in the
smallest third of the distribution, 0 otherwise.
Interaction term; LARGE is 1 if the size (sales) of the firm is in the
largest third of the distribution, 0 otherwise.
Prior years cash salary.
Base salary per employment agreement.
Sales.
Sum of in-the-money value o f exercisable stock options (at IPO price)
and the Black-Scholes (1973) value of unexercisable stock options
(modified for early exercise).
CEO tenure in years.
Standard deviation of post-IPO monthly stock returns.
Firms are exercising growth options: includes uses of proceeds for
working capital and general corporate purposes, capital expenditures,
geographic expansion, current and future acquisitions, and sales and
marketing.
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